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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past, companies used to develop innovative ideas within the organization because of the 
marginal role of the external environment and customers. Gradually, environment grew in 
complexity and in terms of knowledge; the shapes of industries and companies changed as well to 
match the recent outside changes. Chesbrough (2003) theorized all those phenomena that were 
modifying innovation process: firms that used to apply a closed approach while generating and 
managing innovations; nowadays, are using an open approach, in which external knowledge and 
internal knowledge merge, breaking their respective boundaries. Open Innovation (OI) is not only 
a theoretical paradigm; it is also a group of practices applied by many companies in different 
industries while managing business and innovation. 
 
The thesis is divided in 4 chapters: starting from a comprehensive definition of OI, Business Model 
(BM) is introduced to explain the economic feasibility of OI practices; finally, introducing the 
network ability, it is tested the statistical validity of these theoretical concepts. 
 
The first chapter introduces the OI paradigm dealing with inbound and outbound knowledge flows; 
then, the focus moves on spin-offs, divided in academic spin-offs and corporate spin-offs, 
depending on their origins. After an explanation of co-creation process and governance 
mechanisms, the chapter ends providing some concrete examples of small and large companies 
that systematically adopted OI designing their innovation process. Finally, there are some remarks 
on the main ideas introduced in the chapter. 
 
The second chapter illustrates the concept of BM, which is a tool that can be used to translate OI 
theory in formalized practices for companies running innovation process. The business model 
canvas, created by Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010), is introduced to depict a first complete picture 
of the tool; then, the thesis deals with some challenges that are internal and external as well. In 
light of these challenges it is proposed a redesigned BM that offers an interesting alternative to 
start-ups belonging to ICT industries, which need a more dynamic and focalized framework than 
other companies with different size and operating in other industries. Finally, it is described the 
BM innovation: some principles that all together can portray a winning attitude aimed to guarantee 
a continuous improvement and update of the BM, overcoming inner and external challenges. 
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The third chapter deals with networking; in particular, it is divided in two sections: the first about 
collaborative strategies and the second about the Network Ability (NA). In the first section, the 
focal point is placed on collaborative strategies and networking relationships; after an explanation 
of the financial impact, it is stressed the importance of the incubators and their services provided. 
In the second section, it is introduced the NA; an ability of the founder, recognized in literature, 
that should help start-ups in setting and managing relationships with outside partners. It is finally 
introduced the absorptive capacity concept, which in this thesis is conceived as a complement of 
the NA and the control mechanisms that should be used in the long-term to ensure a good strength 
and duration of networking relationships. 
 
The fourth chapter introduces the empirical analysis. After an overview of the innovative and 
economic context of the Italian ICT industry, the focus moves on the presentation of the 
methodologies used to collect data and the sampling procedure, which allows creating a sample of 
innovative ICT start-ups. Statistical analysis is then implemented through R, a statistical software 
used through its intuitive interface called RStudio. First, we estimated three regression models to 
demonstrate the hypotheses put forward in the previous chapters; all the results are commented  
under a managerial perspective. Second, we implemented a cluster analysis, which identified three 
start-ups archetypes. This grouping gives the opportunity to identify optimal strategies and 
guidelines that every innovative start-up should adopt when coping with innovation and networking 
management.  
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CHAPTER 1 – THE OPEN INNOVATION FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 From closed to Open Innovation 
 
Henry Chesbrough (2003) has been the first to theorize the concept of Open Innovation (OI), which 
received large consensus in academia, given the huge number of citations. Consequently, his 
approach found also many fields of application, revealing its important economic value. 
In order to understand the OI framework, it is necessary to introduce first the closed innovation 
model. After the World War II, Xerox and many companies adopted this paradigm: all stages of 
the innovation process were internalized within the boundaries of the firm and the only bridge with 
the external environment was for selling and commercializing innovative ideas, products or 
services (Chesbrough, 2003). 
 
Figure 1 – Closed Innovation Model 
 
Source: Chesbrough (2003) 
 
Companies used to run their business without collaborating with external actors in the market. The 
external environment was quite poor and not stimulating; moreover, there was a predominant fear 
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of knowledge spillovers. For these reasons, firms started an enlargement process that drove a 
vertical integration aimed to guarantee independency from suppliers and distributors (Chesbrough, 
2003). 
Later, some deep changes, like the mobility of the employees across companies and the increase in 
skills of the suppliers, showed how much this closed approach was outdated and not applicable 
anymore; OI era began (Chesbrough, 2003).  
If the first definition of OI was introduced by Chesbrough (2003), Laursen and Salter (2006) 
deepened the model providing interesting empirical results; they affirm that: “an ‘open innovation’ 
model is using a wide range of external factors and sources to help them achieve and sustain 
innovation” (Laursen & Salter, 2006, p.131). Some years later, Chesbrough and Bogers (2014) 
gave the following definition: “We define open innovation as a distributed innovation process 
based on purposively managed knowledge flows across organizational boundaries, using 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary mechanisms in line with the organization’s business model” 
(Chesbrough , 2014, p.12). This is a more mature and complete definition of OI, in which 
knowledge influence and economic implications are connected. 
 
Figure 2 – Open Innovation Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
Source: Chesbrough (2003) 
13 
 
The inbound and outbound features of innovative flows as the pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
mechanisms represent a crucial point. Dahlander & Gann (2010) affirm that these four components 
express the degrees of openness of the company, that is, how much is likely that innovations arise 
and turn into a business outside or inside the company. 
 
Figure 3 – Openness and innovative flows  
Source: Dahlander & Gann (2010) 
 
The same authors provide brief definitions of these four dimensions (Figure 3): 
 
- Revealing: companies that freely reveal internal ideas to the market without expecting a 
pecuniary reward back (indirect reward in the future); 
- Selling: companies that sell their innovations or provide a license to other companies 
expecting in exchange a pecuniary reward; 
- Sourcing: companies analyze their environment to spot innovative ideas that they can 
internalize without any cost; 
- Acquiring: companies gather external ideas to undertake innovation internally in exchange 
of a pecuniary reward. 
 
This new paradigm ignites several inner challenges regarding the management and the overall 
organization. In particular, top managers are accountable for collaborating with external actors and 
appropriating the value generated by inbound and outbound knowledge flows (West et al., 2014). 
In fact, according to van de Vrande et al. (2009), two preliminary factors are crucial: 
 
- Technology exploitation: activities aimed to boost and use technological knowledge located 
outside the company; 
- Technology exploration: activities aimed to internalize outside knowledge and benefit from 
outside technological flows. 
14 
 
Companies should also take care of governance system and incentive system: starting from an 
analysis of the main factors that influence the innovation, they should choose the proper system; 
for instance, Nokia, after the sign of a non-disclosure agreement, gave its production plan to 
external companies, hence adopting a selective reveal of knowledge. Moreover, managers should 
be adequately rewarded with the right incentives that do not necessary have economic implications; 
sometimes managers want to feel part of a community and be recognized as part of it (Wallin & 
Von Krogh, 2010). 
 
Also the context is very important, OI practices are more incisive in specific situations. There is a 
dimension which is internal and external. The internal one comprises inner features of the company 
like the age, the revenues or even the size; the external one is focalized, mainly, on the industry 
and it expresses how internationalization or technology intensity generate positive results under an 
OI perspective (Huizingh, 2011).  
 
OI is a concept that can be found across many industries. This is due to the deep changes of the 
environment and technologies that are not compatible with the traditional innovation model that 
was applied many years ago. Nevertheless, ICT industries are more affected by those kinds of 
phenomena: here the capability to innovate is not only an upgrading factor, but a basic factor that 
is crucial to cope with these markets. 
Van de Vrande et al. (2009) argue that Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) have a 
fundamental role in OI. In this context, entrepreneur and entrepreneurial values are necessary if the 
company wants to exploit and screen the outside technological knowledge; features like the 
Network Ability (NA) (explained later in the text) are the “fuse” needed to light the innovation 
“flame”. Furthermore, these companies prefer to adopt routines that are not formalized and, at the 
same time, they do not invest many resources in innovation, preferring approaches that are effective 
and cheaper (van de Vrande et al., 2009). These companies rely on external networks established 
vertically with customers and suppliers, with university and other academic institutions or 
horizontally with other companies at the same level of the value chain; the extended size of the 
network offsets the limited size of the company and represents a potential source of resources (Lee 
et al., 2010). 
Smaller companies could establish a collaborative agreement with larger companies to utilize 
infrastructure and resources that the former ones do not own; however, to ensure an effective 
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collaboration, both firms have to engage in a win-win relationship (both actors benefit from the 
relationship and leverage its advantages) (Parida & Örtqvist, 2015). 
Small companies could provide their flexibility and the high level of specialization that acquired 
over time; in fact, large companies approaching to OI usually are less flexible and more resistant 
to dimensional and organizational changes (Lee et al., 2010).  
 
Finally, according to Gassmann et al. (2010), it is interesting to draw an overview of the future 
trends that are affecting and changing the shapes of OI paradigm: 
 
- The pervasiveness of the concept: OI concept is been concretely applied in many industries 
and, many times, in contexts far away from ICT; nowadays, it represents the only way a 
company can survive in a dynamic environment; 
- Size: as showed before, small companies, like start-ups, have a crucial role in OI and show 
a greater suitability than larger companies; 
- Innovation process: the new innovative process embraces a more interactive approach and 
a more collaborative thinking that involves customers, suppliers and also universities; 
- Services vs Products: services will gradually reach more importance in matter of 
innovation, services will be able to enhance and sometimes replace the utility stemming 
from a product; 
- To protect the innovation vs to trade the innovation: the closed innovation approach, that 
stimulated a protective attitude towards innovation, is been replaced by an open approach 
in which innovations could be sold to other companies, able to use these ideas to develop 
brand new innovative products or services. 
 
In his book, Chesbrough (2003) stressed the importance of the spin-off companies pointing out that 
they promoted an efficient use and exploitation of those technologies which were lying “on the 
shelf” of larger companies like Xerox. In particular, thanks to their flexibility and size, they reached 
a high level of skills and specialization. 
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1.2 Spin-off companies 
 
Spin-off companies played an important role during the interim period between closed innovation 
and OI eras. These companies encouraged a transmission of knowledge, especially tacit 
knowledge; in fact, if the codified knowledge can be also sold and spread without consistent 
problems, tacit knowledge is embedded within the employees and in the organizational culture 
(Salvador, 2011). 
 
To give a comprehensive definition of this type of company, it is necessary a clear distinction 
between: 
 
- Corporate spin-off: an autonomous company that is focused on a set of activities that a 
larger parent company performs (Els & Bart, 2006); 
- Academic spin-off: an independent company that is been created by a member of university 
that still wants to keep a close relationship with the institute (Markman et al., 2008). 
 
In many cases, technologies that have a wider scope work better for academic spin-offs rather than 
corporate spin-offs; in addition, higher degrees of novelty in technologies imply a lower growth in 
academic ones, while tacit knowledge enhances the opportunities of growth for corporate ones 
(Clarysse et al., 2011). 
 
Harrison & Leitch (2010) noticed that academic spin-offs represent a bridge between universities 
and market side, this link allows a “market test” aimed to understand if a product or service fits 
preferences of the customers. Furthermore, this kind of spin-offs faces specific issues that regard 
their restricted size and the poor skills provided by university in raising financial funds; 
nevertheless, the most important problem regards the Technology Transfer Office (TTO). In fact, 
this office is fundamental to commercialize the academic ideas and gives a huge support to many 
companies at their early stages; but, in many cases, all the advantages generated are captured by 
external actors and not by the university itself. 
 
Visintin & Pittino (2014) demonstrated how the team composition is another important factor in 
this topic: they showed how the heterogeneity of the team (in this case people belonging to 
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academic or non-academic context) can enhance the overall performance because of creative 
discussions and more reliable decisions. This positive effect is always mediated by other 
components like skill background and personal experiences. 
 
National institutions have to create a favorable environment to a kind of company that undergoes 
many troubles and faces many barriers; this is even crucial in some national contexts. 
In terms of policy is necessary to analyze the shapes and the features of the country and industries; 
sometimes it can be useful to establish policies aimed to boost the number of spin-off companies 
or to consolidate the position of certain companies in certain industries. 
In this regard, a study has been conducted to find out how to design effective policies for spin-off 
companies; several moves have been identified: for instance, national institutions should spot those 
industries that show chances of entry and provide them facilities to lessen the competition or ensure 
legal protection (Gilsing et al., 2010). 
 
Wennberg et al. (2011), in depicting a policy framework, expressed some problems that are 
peculiar for each type of spin-off (academic or corporate). Academic spin-offs confirm their lead 
position in knowledge generators, nevertheless they lack direct knowledge of markets and contacts, 
for this reason, they experience a worse performance (in terms of employee growth and sales 
growth) than corporate spin-offs. Finally, corporate spin-offs, despite the greater performance, they 
own a knowledge that is strictly commercial rather than theoretical. 
 
The next step is to deal with the vertical innovation mechanisms (supplier or customer 
relationships) to enter a more concrete side of OI; furthermore, it is taken in consideration the 
possible governance framework that can be applied to fully generate and capture the value created 
through these mechanisms and OI practices in general. 
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1.3 Co-creation and governance system 
 
Among all the definitions of co-creation provided in the literature, Roser et al. (2013) provided the 
simplest and most comprehensive one: co-creation is a creative process performed among 
stakeholders, in an interactive way, started by the firm at diverse phases of the value generation 
process. In this thesis, the focus is on the co-creation processes involving customers that are the 
most common ones; nevertheless, in some cases, the focus will move on suppliers as well. 
Von Hippel (1986) introduced the term of the so-called “lead user”: a user that is able to enjoy 
some benefits by finding a solution to certain needs and capable to lead some important trends that, 
in turn, will push other users to experience certain needs that lead user experienced first. 
Gradually, companies stimulated a continuous engagement of the customer in innovative process 
by, for instance, providing samples of product or setting personal contacts. Franke & Piller (2003) 
stressed the importance of the “mass customization”: in this case, information obtained by 
customers represent the main source to solve market needs, users are integrated in the value chain 
of the supplier. Furthermore, toolkits represent the best interaction system between company and 
user: it comprises a configuration software that leads the user throughout the process, a feedback 
system that allows the user to “learn by doing” and, finally, all the results are analyzed by the 
company to be translated in products or services. 
Users become the co-creators of the products, able, not only to reduce the research costs and the 
risk of wrong innovations, but to enhance the likelihood that an innovation will be successful; it is 
discussed if this kind of involvement has a positive effect more in matter of incremental innovation 
than in matter of radical innovation (Parida & Örtqvist, 2015). 
 
The practice of free revealing (introduced in the previous paragraphs) is very effective if it is done 
on user innovation networks (networks, regarding for instance developing or selling activities, that 
are spread across many users horizontally). Their main output is the user-generated content: 
content, available publicly, stemming from innovative and creative activities, performed in an 
amateur way (Schweisfurth et al., 2011). 
User-generated content is another interesting tool: if it is a subsidiary tool in developing the right 
solutions, for online dictionaries like Wikipedia it is vital because all the content is generated 
entirely by users (Bughin, 2007). Bughin et al. (2008) introduced many examples of companies 
that created products by interacting with customers. LEGO collected suggestions sent by users to 
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create new product models, while Threadless outsourced t-shirt design process to its customers. 
Some companies opened the idea-generation process to customers, while other companies 
preferred to rely on customer for idea-selection process based on the leakage of designs pre-
developed by the company; firms like Google or Facebook provided public software and 
complementary resources to support both idea-generation and idea-selection process (King & 
Lakhani, 2013). 
 
A crucial condition in co-creation process is the free revealing (free leakage of knowledge to the 
public) that, against any classic economic theory, has some indirect advantages. According to von 
Hippel (2007), a free revealing process is able to enhance the overall reputation of the company. 
Moreover, the innovation cannot be kept secret for a very long time horizon and, however, is firm 
specific; finally, profits generated (increase in the customer base) and the increase in asset value 
offsets costs the company bore. It is also true that a fully free leakage of information can seriously 
damage the companies and dissipate the benefits; a right solution could be a selective reveal. In 
this case, companies apply a mix between free reveal of information to the market and protective 
tools; this allows an appropriation of all the benefits of the free revealing, reducing costs and 
finding a new application for a technology (Henkel, 2006). 
 
After all these examples and applications of co-creation techniques in products, it is natural to think 
about the services as well; for their intangible features, they could seem harder to manage and to 
be placed in a context of OI. 
Chesbrough (2011) affirms that it is a matter of “bringing the outside in” and “taking the inside 
out”. Companies like LEGO shared programmable motors with their customers to push the 
generation of brand new designs (“bringing the outside in”), while other companies like Amazon 
leaked their expertise to other companies and, contemporarily, they offered the access to its own 
servers to become an infrastructure provider (“taking the inside out”). 
Innovation applied in services requires a close interaction with the customer; under a wider vision 
it embraces a so-called S-D logic. Vargo et al. (2008) argue that services require this kind of logic: 
a perspective in which companies and users are able to co-create value promoting frequent 
interactions through integrating resources and skills. There is no real value until a service offered 
outside is experienced by customers. In a context of value creation, two drivers can be identified: 
the value-in-use that represents the “nominal value” usually associated to the price paid for the 
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service and the value-in-exchange which is embedded in resources and competencies which, when 
exchanged, are able to activate the value. Summarizing, under an S-D logic the value is co-created 
by a reciprocal exchange of services between parties (Vargo & Lusch, 2004). Finally, Payne et al. 
(2008) in their paper introduced some direct implications stemming from this innovative logic: new 
technologies offer an interesting opportunity to build a more valuable relationship with the 
customer, boundaries of industry have become more blurred and there are new tools to reach the 
customer. Finally, the changes in customer tastes and lifestyles allow a more customized and 
personal relationship with the customer. 
 
It is necessary to point out that a co-creation relationship implies a vertical collaboration with 
customers and suppliers as well. Cova & Salle (2008) provide an extensive vision of the S-D 
(Service Dominant) logic that comprises suppliers, customers and their respective networks: first, 
the co-creation process occurs between supplier and customers (with their networks); then it occurs 
between the supplier with the respective network and the customer with the respective network. 
If the social dimension was often considered in old papers, nowadays it has a key role in explaining 
the new paradigm of innovation and it will be discussed throughout this thesis in the next chapters. 
 
To ensure the whole capture of the innovative ideas generated or selected during the co-creation 
process, it is important to establish clear governance systems and procedures depending on the 
situation. In some cases, consumers that produce user-generated content claim that reasons for the 
engagement are altruism, fame or fun; factors that have a non-economic nature (Bughin et al., 
2008). 
When companies create communities aimed to co-creation activities, they have to establish clear 
procedures that balance the freedom of the participants and conflict solving; a good idea could be 
to put employees within the community, encouraging a better control and a better efficacy of the 
process (Bughin et al., 2008). Hadaya & Cassivi (2012) argue that two fundamental governance 
mechanisms can be found: formal ones relying on third-party enforcement, like for instance, legal 
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contracts and informal ones relying on trust that exists between parties, like for instance, goodwill 
trust (belief that the partner will behave with responsibility respecting the interests of the firm1).  
Customers should be put at the center of the organization and all the co-creation activities should 
be conducted with a direct interaction with them. An effective co-creation system should be based 
on two principles: the whole integration of the customer to create value and the matching of the 
activities related to co-creation process and new skills acquired (X. Zhang & Chen, 2008). 
 
Roser et al. (2013) introduced a new dimension that deeply influences how a co-creation process 
is managed, the crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing is defined as the activity to appoint an external 
community (or network) to perform a work that was first performed within the company (Whitla, 
2009). In doing governance decisions, crowdsourcing implies a different approach (e.g. usually a 
market approach in the case of crowdsourcing); furthermore, the type of market served by the 
company has an impact, a B2B company will act differently from a B2C company (Roser et al., 
2013). 
 
Many studies, regarding governance systems, adopted the Resource-Based View (RBV) to describe 
the most appropriate governance mechanisms. ”RBV has been introduced and developed to 
describe how managing organizational resources strategically can generate sustainable 
competitive advantages for the firm” (Jamali et al., 2015, p.137). Barney (1991), one of the first 
authors that coined this term, added that investments dedicated, for instance,  to employee training 
or employee engagement systems can potentially provide high outcomes if aimed to those 
resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN). Internal challenges, 
regarding managers or resources, are important to drive an adjustment to cope with external 
challenges resulting from OI; top managers are responsible to promote the necessary solutions to 
overcome these challenges (West et al., 2014). In the case of start-ups, the RBV is a good starting 
point to build competitive advantage and to nurture the ability to apprehend external signals. These 
companies tend to compensate their restricted size by relying on external ties provided by larger 
networks they belong. 
                                                 
1 Li, W. and Veysel, Y. (2013). Research on relationship between goodwill trust, competence trust and 
alliance performance. Proceedings of 2013 6th International Conference on Information Management, 
Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering, ICIII 2013. IEEE, 2, pp. 569–573. 
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1.4 Companies that adopted OI paradigm 
 
OI has a consolidated literature and there are many concrete examples of companies that applied 
this concept in defining and running their business activities. To introduce these examples is 
necessary to fix and understand a concept that, even if it could seem theoretical and abstract, was 
born due to real needs expressed by the market; the final aim of this chapter is to give quick 
examples regarding how OI paradigm is been adopted by companies. 
 
1.4.1 BlaBlaCar 
 
Founded in France in 2006, BlaBlaCar is a two-sided platform that connects drivers available to 
give a ride and people that request a ride; the “touch point” between drivers and passengers is 
reached through the company website (www.blablacar.com).  
Di Minin et al. (2016) provide an analysis regarding how this company experienced an unaware 
application of OI paradigm: this company noticed that there was the opportunity to create a new 
segment in the market; it created a smart website as bridge of these customers and, at the same 
time, as control system based on feedback system.  
The application of the paradigm is clearer if the focus is moved on the factors that drove the success 
of this company: firstly, users can generate content and provide suggestions that are considered by 
the company; secondly, company acquired other start-ups to reach core skills, resources faster or 
scalability of the business faster than competitors (Di Minin et al., 2016). 
 
1.4.2 STMicroelectronics 
 
STMicroelectronics was born in 1998 and it operates in ICT industry in Switzerland. It owns the 
3% of the semiconductors’ market worldwide and it is one of the largest producer in this industry 
(www.st.com). In this case, the main innovation drivers are: the integration of the customer in 
innovation process; the capability to lead co-creation process; provision of information about the 
demand (the customers are business themselves so they have a specialized knowledge); application 
of Internet of Things (IoT) in production process, especially to develop advanced technologies like 
nano-technologies (Di Minin et al., 2016). 
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1.4.3 Procter & Gamble 
 
Established in United States in 1837, P&G is one of the biggest companies worldwide; it operates 
in many markets through many brands and it currently generates approximately $16 billion of sales 
(www.pg.com). For all these features, this company does not seem the right target company which 
can be used as comparable company; especially in a thesis that is focused in analyzing OI under a 
start-up perspective. Nevertheless, it is useful to point out how this company is been able to exploit 
the OI paradigm and overcome huge barriers and organizational resistance. One of the main steps 
to innovation is been the “Connect and Develop” program: introduced to turn technologies, 
developed in the organization, into product; to reach this step it was decided within the company a 
collaboration with outside partners almost for 50% of business activities (Sakkab, 2002). The 
program promoted a strategy aimed to collaboration between employees themselves and between 
employees and people outside the company: to foster this collaboration, P&G introduced a website 
platform called “InnovationNet”, aimed to external and internal worldwide data sharing among 
employees, to boost innovation and promote an international view. Then the American company 
introduced “CreateInnovate”, a small group of 18 employees working with other 18 people outside 
the company: the idea was to create an interaction among people with diversified skills and diverse 
knowledge backgrounds; this could increase a more critic discussion and more prudent decisions 
(Dodgson et al., 2006). 
 
All these initiatives point out that Procter and Gamble, supporting advanced technological 
improvements and virtual applications, tried to transmit OI practices to people within the company. 
In fact, with their knowledge base, their skills and their organizational procedures, they are the 
starting point of an effective innovative change strategy and they can determine a good or a bad 
implementation of the consequent technological and operational transformation. 
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1.4.4 The Italian companies 
 
Lazzarotti & Manzini (2009) deployed explicitly the difference between closed innovator and open 
innovator: the first innovator type focuses their investment in internal R&D and in the development 
of technologies within the company because they think that openness cannot be properly managed 
to drive profitability. The second innovator type acknowledges the importance of R&D investment 
but it truly believes that it is not sufficient without exploiting the complementary role of OI 
practices. 
 
Table 1 – Italian Innovators (%) 
Source: Lanzarotti and Manzini (2009) 
 
In Table 1, that is reported on the same paper (2009), the authors interviewed 52 italian companies 
that, depending on the answers, are been collected in 4 categories: Open Innovators, Closed 
Innovators, Specialised Collaborators and Integrated collaborators (in this case the focus is only on 
the first two categories). An interesting result regards the size of the company within the two 
categories. There are more big companies, less medium companies and more small companies in 
Closed Innovators group; while there are less big companies, more medium companies and less 
small companies in Open Innovators group. These outcomes lead to some conclusions:  
 
- Big companies are not likely to change their practices and move to the new paradigm maybe 
because of organizational constraints and sunk costs;  
- Medium companies are very open and systematically apply these kinds of routines within 
production process;  
- Small companies prefer closed innovation thinking maybe because of the poor resources 
that they own or the closed-minded vision of their respective entrepreneur(s). 
Open 
Innovators
Closed 
Innovators
Specialized 
collaborators
Integrated 
collaborators
N. of companies (%) 43% 41% 9% 7%
Size (%)
25% big; 40% 
medium; 35% 
small
26% big; 21% 
medium; 53% 
small
0% big; 50% 
medium; 50% 
small
0% big; 67% 
medium; 33% 
small
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1.5 Final remarks 
 
At the beginning of the chapter, closed innovation and OI are compared and it seems that the first 
paradigm is been replaced by the second one that represents the only answer for the companies to 
effectively cope with the variability of the external environment. Regarding this, Trott & Hartmann 
(2009) introduced two important thoughts. First, the dichotomy between the two paradigms does 
not imply that the companies that want to innovate have to choose between these two paradigms 
without trying to apply alternative approaches; second, during the closed innovation era, companies 
like IBM or Xerox managed to survive and co-evolve with the respective markets without explicitly 
applying the OI practices. However, an awareness of the innovative practices applied and a formal 
application of OI allow exploiting, in a complete manner, all the advantages offered by the 
paradigm. 
 
Further, the focus of the thesis has been placed on the definition of the OI paradigm, the benefits 
of its application and the implications; it is important to point out the problems faced by the 
companies, but also the inner problems of the OI itself. When sourcing external knowledge, 
companies need to verify the accuracy and validity of information gathered; furthermore, the 
collaboration with outside partners implies transaction costs that cannot be ignored (Keupp & 
Gassmann, 2009). Regarding internal challenges, Sieg et al. (2010), analyzing seven chemical 
companies established in Germany, found out that there are three main managerial challenges faced 
by the companies that apply OI. The first challenge is the resistance of scientists: scientists working 
for the firm in many cases are reluctant to adopt this approach because they do not want to leak 
sensitive information outside the company without a proper patent protection. The second is to 
select the problems that could be revealed to external partners and have back the solutions for those 
problems. Finally, the third challenge is to formulate in the right way the problems: companies, in 
communicating with outside collaborators, should strive to avoid a specific language in the 
formulation and strive to formulate the issue in terms of goals meant to be achieved and not in 
terms of solutions meant to be reached. Often, managers are new with this kind of way of thinking; 
they can lack the right knowledge base or for instance, they can lack an open-minded vision  that, 
in turn, pushes the managers to seek profits through following a paradigm that seems contrary to 
the main economic principles (King & Lakhani, 2013). A research conducted to explore SAFER, 
an OI interface that involves 22 actors (like universities and companies), set three challenges that 
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are faced within the companies, the organizations and SAFER itself. For instance, it is difficult to 
comply with the decision system within the interface, to have the right balance between 
organizations that create new knowledge and organizations that expect to gather new knowledge; 
finally, it is hard to perform a proper selection of the optimal people that should belong to the 
interface (Ollila & Elmquist, 2011).  
 
Moreover, the chapter focuses on the customers dealing with co-creation topic is not random: in a 
research conducted by Enkel & Gassmann (2007) on more than one hundred companies, 78% of 
the respondents declared that customers represent their main source of outside knowledge. 
Nowadays, customers are more active, more dynamic, they dedicate more resources in searching 
information; in many cases, they can create something that could harm the competitive advantage 
reached by a company (e.g. Open Source Software). It is also true that companies employ more 
resources in R&D than customers and have specialized skills acquired through direct experience; 
in high-tech industries, usually, companies have an high amount of R&D expenses, even if, 
nowadays, this amount is decreasing (Enkel & Gassmann, 2007).   
 
Finally, the chapter shows some specificities of start-ups, which are the unit of analysis of the 
thesis; they usually rely on informal ties because of a minor resource involvement and the safety 
of the relationship. In an OI context, companies (not necessarily small, f.e. Procter & Gamble) are 
used to this kind of interaction (Chesbrough & Brunswicker, 2013; Enkel et al., 2011; Fichter, 
2009): in this case, the relationships are based on trust and common expectations, instead of explicit 
formal rules (Brunswicker & Ehrenmann, 2013). This respects flexibility and speed that are core 
principles of the OI paradigm: firms struggling to apply OI practices have to show these attributes 
to match and overcome the features of the market that they serve, especially in specific contexts 
like the ICT one. The overall aim of this chapter has been the definition of OI concept, providing 
a clear and concrete application of the concept in real life business. 
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CHAPTER 2 – OPEN INNOVATION BUSINESS MODEL FOR ICT START-UPS 
 
2.1 Business Model Canvas 
 
After a complete explanation of the OI paradigm, it is relevant to talk about the Business Model 
(BM) concept. The application of a BM is the only tool that can ensure that the OI practices are 
concretely applied, coherently with the strategy and the objectives of the company. About this, 
Baden-Fuller & Haefliger (2013) argue that “developing the right technology is a matter of a 
business model decision regarding openness and user engagement” (p.419). 
This concept is present in many articles regarding OI paradigm (Brunswicker & Ehrenmann, 2013; 
Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Chesbrough, 2011; Konsti-Laakso et al., 2012; West et al., 
2014). While in the previous chapter it is been possible to find a stable and recurrent definition of 
OI, in the case of BM it is not so simple because of the novelty of the term. The term is widely 
used and, even if it is applied in many concrete cases, it does not have a full theoretical 
comprehension.  
 
Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010) give the following definition of BM: “a business model describes 
the rationale of how an organization creates, delivers, and captures value” (p.14). This definition 
could be simple but comprises many features that are integrated in the overall model. 
 
According to Timmers (1998), the BM is “an architecture for the product, service and information 
flows, including a description of the various business actors and their roles; a description of the 
potential benefits for the various business actors; a description of the sources of revenue” (p.3). 
This is a more comprehensive definition that includes additional factors that are not taken in 
consideration in the previous definition. For example, it is pointed out the architectural validity, 
the importance of each internal and external actor that collaborates with the company and it is 
specified that there are always economic implications that justify the necessity of cash flows to 
finance the business. 
 
Wirtz et al. (2016) affirm that: “In addition to the architecture of value creation, strategic as well 
as customer and market components are taken into consideration, in order to achieve the 
superordinate goal of generating, or rather, securing the competitive advantage” (p.41).  
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Through this sentence, it is added the strategic validity of the BM; it is clear-cut how the BM 
requires a total change of the company with heavy organizational changes. 
 
If this concept represents the leading definition through the thesis, to describe the main components 
of the BM, the business model canvas contained in the paper by Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010) will 
be introduced.  
Company, in designing its BM, should start defining the right Customer Value Proposition (CVP): 
beginning from the identification of the group of customers to satisfy, company should spot the 
needs asked by its demand and provide the right offering that solves those needs (Porter, 1996). 
The offering is created through the right mix of resources and skills: about this topic, Baden-Fuller 
& Haefliger (2013) claim the leading role of technology and users. In particular, there is an 
interactive relationship between technology and BM: a BM can deeply change the way a 
technology is sold in the market; at the same time, a technology can require a generation of a new 
BM or a modification of the existing one. Regarding the users, they have a crucial role, not only 
because they are addressees of the message contained in CVP, but also because they can influence 
the way the value is created and if it is created or not (Baden-Fuller & Haefliger, 2013). Disruption 
of recent technologies and demographic shifts are changing the skills required and the shapes of 
the BM: it is needed a process of “reskilling” to update the competencies of the workforce across 
the majority of the industries. This process implies a necessary change of the BM, especially in 
those industries in which technology has the strongest impact (World Economic Forum, 2016). 
In the case of start-ups, entrepreneur has a very important role in providing his/her own skills and 
create the right background to foster human capital skills. After the studies at university, the young 
entrepreneur usually tries to develop general skills that are after embedded in a certain job profile; 
they should try to apply this general view in deciding for human capital strategy (Lazear, 2004). 
Often, smaller companies have a lack of skills and, at the same times, poor resources to invest in 
gathering them. Papagiannidis & Li (2005) talk about the so-called skills brokerage: a reciprocal 
exchange of skills that occurs between the entrepreneurs and skills brokers. In the information-
driven markets, skills are crucial to elaborate and exploit the data; if the skills brokerage is an 
interesting solution, it should be supported by an open view of the entrepreneur that could rely on 
relationships with other actors like venture capitalists (to raise capital especially in the earliest 
stages) or incubators to promote growth paths. Furthermore, skills brokerage can represent the 
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natural solution for start-ups, not only in case of ICT markets, but also when companies establish 
networks with other external actors. 
To clarify the BM concept, the business model canvas is introduced. This framework, ideated by 
Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010), describes the BM as an architecture that comprises nine building 
blocks showed in the next figure and deployed in the next lines. 
 
Figure 4 – The Business Model Canvas 
Source: Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010) 
 
The components2 of the canvas are: 
 
- Value proposition: as written before, company has to provide a certain solution to solve a 
certain need claimed by the customers served, this implies to introduce the right offering in 
terms of products or services; 
- Customer segments: it is crucial to define specifically the customer or the group of 
customers that the company wants to reach; 
                                                 
2 All the definitions are inspired by: Osterwalder, A., Pigneur, Y., (2010). Business Model Generation – A Handbook 
for Visionaries, Game Changers and Challengers. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey. 
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- Channels: these are the “touch points” between the company and the customers, the only 
way to communicate and sell the offering; 
- Customer relationships: there are many kinds of relationships that depend on the type of 
customer and the type of strategy undertaken by the firm; 
- Revenue streams: these are the cash flows that are created by effectively delivering value 
proposition to customers; 
- Key resources: every company needs some resources to create value proposition, deliver it 
and make the BM work; 
- Key activities: like in the previous case, company needs to perform all the activities 
necessary to run the BM; 
- Key partnerships: company can run the BM only through a network that includes all the 
partners; 
- Cost structure: all the operations conducted to run the BM imply some expenses. 
 
In doing a preliminary analysis of the right BM to adopt, company should take care of BM phase. 
It could represent a useless step and a consideration that does not cause significant changes in the 
market; nevertheless, it can be very important to achieve inner goals and pursue efficiency. Amit 
& Zott (2012), adopting an activity system perspective, introduce three elements that should be the 
cornerstone in designing the BM: the content (the activities that company have to carry out); the 
structure (the linkages among all these activities); the governance (system adopted to decide the 
people accountable for doing the activities). Dubosson-Torbay et al. (2002) talk about some 
dimensions that affect the design of BMs in ICT industry; if some of those overlap with the nine 
components introduced previously in the chapter, others regard something new. In particular, those 
are: the degrees of innovative process, for instance a company could do the same stuff but through 
innovative ways or introduce radical innovations; the bargaining power of the supplier or the buyer; 
finally, the transaction control, which can vary from self-organized to hierarchical control system. 
  
The entire thesis adopts a general view of the company, except when the focus is moved on the 
ICT industry. Start-up enterprises face many constraints and barriers that other companies do not; 
as said before, one of them is the size itself. Sigmund et al. (2015) affirm that it is generally 
recognized a “liability of smallness”, a concept that it has been introduced many years ago. 
Essentially, smaller companies lack some resources and exchange ties that hinder an optimal 
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growth of the business; this feature causes an overall unattractiveness of the organization towards 
other companies. In addition, Abatecola et al. (2012) recognize a “liability of newness”, a concept 
firstly introduced by Arthur Stinchcombe in his works. In particular, companies, which are at the 
early stages of their life cycle, experience a higher failure rate than those companies that are in the 
latter stages of the life cycle.  
 
2.2 Emerging challenges 
 
Companies that belong to ICT industry face more challenges than companies belonging to low-
tech industries; nowadays, technologies are more advanced and have more implications than the 
past. For instance, firms that provide cloud-computing services face many challenges regarding 
physical and virtual constraints of the actual technologies. Machine learning and virtualization are 
changing the boundaries of the industry and BMs, energy efficiency is a constant thought of the 
companies that use these powerful technologies. Finally, the increase in the data exchanged and 
uploaded requires an accurate analysis of the traffic on the platform and a good protection against 
malwares or other kinds of viruses (Zhang et al., 2010).  
 
Individual features of the companies are important for the determination of their reaction to changes 
and emergent problems in the industry. Van Der Meer (2007) analyzed the main barriers faced by 
Dutch companies in approaching and implementing OI. In particular, he found out that many 
companies failed in innovative projects because of lack of resources but also lack of the right 
management vision; similar problems were found in SMEs that pointed out how the borrowing 
capacity and R&D capabilities are other crucial barriers to innovate. 
Entrepreneur, for instance, can lack the right motivation or cognitive scheme to innovate or create 
a BM or the entire organizational structure itself can hide many problems, e.g. daily routines or 
poor innovation process (Björkdahl, 2013). 
 
It is also important, in designing the BM, to control the gradual implementation of the BM in all 
its phases; in fact, these phases can hide other important challenges that should be controlled by 
the company. Frankenberger et al. (2013) introduced a comprehensive framework of the phases of 
the BM specifying all the arising challenges. They recognize four main phases (4Is): 
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- Initiation: company starts from the analysis of the external environment to understand how 
to define the boundaries of the BM; the main challenges are to identify the needs of the 
stakeholders and formalize the change drivers. 
- Ideation: companies draft some ideas; here they have to be careful about thinking in an 
open-minded way, thinking under a BM perspective and trying to develop new tools aimed 
to BM creation. 
- Integration: stage in which BM is built; in this case, core issues are to “put together” all the 
components of the BM and to manage relationships with partners. 
- Implementation: the model is finally implemented; company should overcome all the inner 
resistance due to organizational routines or employees and should apply techniques, like 
trial-and-error, to reduce risks stemming from BM. 
 
The right management of the network of partners is another important concern; it is not a 
coincidence that in these four steps these collaborators are always taken in consideration and this 
importance is coherent with the focus on the start-ups, adopted throughout the thesis. Networks 
comprise many kinds of collaborators like suppliers, customers or competitors that, at the same 
time, have different objectives; this diversity can cause some conflicts that, in turn, damage the 
solidity of the BM (Spieth et al., 2014). 
Schneider & Spieth (2013) argue that the main barriers in BM are “confusion and obstruction”. 
According to them, managers, through a proper knowledge management, are able to overcome 
these barriers; furthermore, they can show, under an operational perspective, the concrete 
advantages introduced by a renewal of the BM or a creation of a brand new BM. Other important 
managerial challenges regard the innovation management: companies should focus only on a 
restricted group of innovations that are promising, dismiss the project that do not bring any positive 
result and promote a coordination among the single team and the overall company strategy; finally 
it is needed a specific concern about the business scalability (Lindgardt et al., 2009). Business 
scalability is the ability to generate marginal profits that are higher than marginal costs; a company 
that wants to achieve this objective should understand how the BM could match a larger scale of 
customers (Björkdahl, 2013). 
All these problems can be included in a unique possible answer: companies have to intervene on 
their existing model or on a new BM if they do not have one. Co-existence of the old BM and new 
BM can provoke problems that can be eliminated with an overall openness of the model and a 
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constant experimentation; these two solutions have several implications that affect the costs and 
the revenues as well (Chesbrough, 2007).  
 
Figure 5 – The challenges of Business Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Source: own elaboration 
 
 It is possible to delineate an overall summary of the challenges faced by the company: internal 
challenges, like organizational resistance or closed-minded vision of the entrepreneur, and external 
challenges, like the dynamic evolution of the environment and the relationship with the network 
(Figure 5). The only way to get out from those “challenge circles” is the Business Model Innovation 
(BMI) that will be explained later in a specific chapter; this process, in turn, can be achieved only 
adopting an open view of the BM and implementing experimentation to understand which is the 
right BM strategy to overcome the challenges. Nevertheless, BMI should be the final step of an 
innovative change that starts from redesigning the BM, taking in consideration start-ups and ICT 
context (a dynamic and unstable environment). 
 
Company 
External Challenges 
Internal Challenges 
Business 
Model 
Innovation 
34 
 
2.3 Redesigning the Business Model for start-ups in ICT industries 
 
The BM framework, introduced by Osterwalder & Pigneur in their respective book (2010), can 
provide a simple and clear representation of all the main components of a company. Nevertheless, 
start-ups that operate in ICT industries have peculiar needs that are not completely compatible with 
that framework and they adopt a dynamic perspective that requires a dynamic vision of the BM as 
well. Next lines will introduce a renewed and integrated BM framework specifically designed and 
adapted for start-ups in ICT industries. 
 
2.3.1 The activity system and Resource-Based View 
 
Before introducing the first building block of the redesigned BM, it is crucial to mention a tool 
that, for its pervasiveness and richness, it is considered a constant background of start-ups 
companies, which operate in ICT markets; the internet platform. 
It is well known that through internet it is possible to get access to many sources of information 
bearing a very low cost; furthermore, there is a high availability of free services and systems that 
potentially can deeply affect organizational procedures. Angehrn (1997) argues that internet 
provided additional space that overcame boundaries of traditional marketplace. In particular, this 
space affects several dimensions. Company information can be spread to many people through web 
channels and new information can be gathered by company itself; new communication channels 
allow to break geographical and physical constraints; products and services can be sold online 
nationally and internationally; finally, transactions and payment process can be completely 
managed with the minimum waste of resources.     
If the previous considerations underline the richness (in terms of different functions) of internet, 
pervasiveness is important as well. Nowadays, World Wide Web “placed its roots” in many 
different contexts; hence it is not strange that business is been also affected. Even if literature about 
this topic is not well developed, there are BMs that are driven by internet features; the so-called 
internet-based models (Morris et al., 2005). 
 
Usually, companies perform different activities that have a different impact on BMs and 
accomplishment of strategic objectives; it is useful to define a comprehensive approach that 
comprises all the activities and gives instructions about the proper activity management. 
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Zott & Amit (2010) introduced the concept of activity system: a system that defines the group of 
activities performed by the company (from procurement phase to distribution phase), keeping the 
focus on the value created by each activity. It is obvious that value created depends on partners that 
interact with the company while conducting activities. The same authors provided four “design 
themes” that should characterize every activity: 
 
- Novelty: firms should select new activities, new ways to manage them and new ways to 
link them; 
- Lock-in: activities should act like a magnet towards other partners to turn them into active 
part of BM, for instance lock-in  can regard switching costs or network externalities; 
- Complementarities: activities should show complementarities to guarantee that, if activities 
are performed jointly within the system, company is able to create more value than each 
activity per se; 
- Efficiency: companies should design activities to pursue an overall efficiency aimed to 
minimize total costs. 
 
Activities are often placed at the center of BM theories; according to Zott et al. (2011), they can be 
considered as the catalyst able to drive a unification of the different concepts of BM. 
Activity system is the inner tool that allows to generate value that, later, is perceived externally by 
customers; companies, once they have set a clear strategic position in the market, should put 
additional effort in activity system (Seddon & Freeman, 2004). 
Activities differ from resources because of their interdependence with internal capabilities and 
competencies of the employees; nevertheless, the key to create value is to combine the right 
activities with the right resources in an effective way (Shafer et al., 2005). In fact, resources and 
activities are not able to create value by themselves; value is generated by finding the best 
relationship between those two components. 
 
Resource-Based View (RBV) definition is been already introduced in the previous chapter; the 
main objective of this paragraph is to understand how RBV can drive an effective design of BM. 
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It is demonstrated that this view is strictly linked with knowledge (crucial factor in ICT) and 
relations (crucial factor in start-ups); nevertheless, RBV is a prominent concept across many topics, 
including BM (Acedo et al., 2006). 
Managers have a leading role in RBV; only their proactive behavior is able to activate resources 
within the company. In particular, they have to: consider functionalities of resources to decide the 
most profitable utilization, recombine resources to foster company expansion and, finally, manage 
activities because the latters can encourage a process of growth (Lockett et al., 2009). It is important 
to point out that activities are accountable to generate capacity and to create resources over time. 
Furthermore, resources are deeply linked with capabilities, hence knowledge flows. In fact, under 
an OI perspective, companies need to develop dynamic capabilities, keep them within the 
organization to create and modify resources over time; this is crucial to encourage an equilibrium 
between internal and external environment (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009). All these 
conditions are aimed to put RBV on the same level of OI; indeed, these concepts have a 
complementary nature and not a substitute one. Vanhaverbeke (2006) argues that RBV encourages 
a careful analysis of inner resources to understand if there are complementarities with resources 
owned by other companies; this is the starting point to create a network and to decide properly the 
optimal partners. Summarizing, resources are created through activities and knowledge 
management (capabilities); adopting RBV, companies are able to manage networking activities 
and, more generally, relationships with external environment. 
 
2.3.2 Customerization – an integrated customer-centric view   
 
The second building block of the redesigned BM regards the approach that an ICT start-up should 
follow in designing marketing strategy. In particular, value proposition, customer segments, 
customer relationships and channels are included in this view; nevertheless, if Osterwalder & 
Pigneur (2010) treated them as separate building block of the canvas, under customerization 
perspective, they are an active part of a unique building block. This decision reflects needs 
introduced by disruptive trends that occurred in ICT markets. Concepts like Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) and Segmentation do not work in those environments and show their limits 
when facing international competition. If companies traditionally had to follow a careful process 
to became global, nowadays, there are start-ups that do not follow these conventional steps; the so-
called “born globals” (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2004). 
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Recent evolutions in ICT industry affected the customer behavior in two main ways: groups of 
customers are more fragmented and, at the same time, some of those are empowered; in particular, 
they can actively refuse certain market offerings because they are looking for certain particular 
services, hence influencing value proposition offered by companies (Pires et al., 2006). 
Customerization is a term stemming from the union of two words: mass customization and 
customized marketing. In particular, companies, which apply this concept, leave more control to 
the customer in transaction; but they try to influence end-users through framing the offering 
alternatives (Wind & Rangaswamy, 2001).  
 
Companies, while choosing the right target of marketing strategy, should focus on those customers 
that are empowered and that are willing to pay more for the additional services they are searching; 
if this move seems simple, the consequent outcome is far from been predictable (Pires et al., 2006). 
Then, it is crucial to decide the proper channel able to deliver value proposition, coherently with 
the targeted customer or group of customers. 
 
To choose the right channel is very important because certain channels imply different forms of 
customer support; for instance, companies that choose to serve customers through direct channels 
are able to provide a more qualitative support than companies that adopt indirect channels (Goffin, 
1999). Once companies decided to adopt whether indirect or direct channels, they have to select 
the proper kinds of channels within these two categories; for instance, in ICT industries, it is very 
common to adopt internet as distribution platform (e-commerce) or as engagement and interaction 
platform (community). It is demonstrated that companies, which prefer virtual interactions to 
physical ones, are able to survive for a longer period than companies that do not (Kauffman & 
Wang, 2008). To select the right channel is a matter of value proposition; for instance, if company 
is pursuing high level of quality, it should secure its source of assets and try to establish a more 
intimate relationship with respective customers (Ballon & Van Heesvelde, 2011). Finally, 
innovative solutions that are introduced can deeply affect channel selection and management 
depending on degrees of novelty; in fact, radical innovations require dedicated channels able to 
keep and even boost the inner potential value of the innovation (Grilo & Jardim-Goncalves, 2010). 
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During and after purchases, social dimension has an enormous impact fostered by social networks 
and online communities; nowadays, people are connected everywhere thanks to mobile devices 
and high development of connectivity infrastructure. Shu (2011) argues that, before purchasing a 
good or a service, customers tend to talk with friends and other people belonging to their social 
circle; in the end, people will probably buy what other people recommended to purchase. These 
mechanisms seem reasonable: people that buy online face constant trust problems and low 
bargaining power; furthermore, customers are influenced by their social group and, for this reason, 
adopt a behavior that fit the collective one. Companies can start offering space on their website 
reserved to customers discussions, they could provide samples of new product they are 
commercializing; finally, company could search information that customer left on social networks, 
like habits, preferences and thoughts expressed about purchasing experience (Wei et al., 2011).  
Companies should focus more resources and more effort in setting a more close relationships with 
those people that are more loyal to the brand than other customers. Nevertheless, brand loyalty is 
anchored in economic reasons and not in emotional engagement or irrational reasons, which often 
drive customer through transactional experience. About this topic, Schultz (2000) introduced the 
so-called brand advocates: some customers, driven by emotional motivations, can develop a high 
level of engagement towards the brand. These people become active supporters of the company 
depending on the membership to one of these two groups: people hired by the company and people 
that become advocates in a spontaneous way.  
People, which had positive experiences with some products and felt connected to the values 
promoted by the brand, will spontaneously share positive thoughts about the brand through “word 
of mouth” mechanisms, occurring between them and their friends (Kemp et al., 2012). Because of 
recent developments of digital connections, “word of mouth” turned into “word of mouse”; 
physical interactions are been largely replaced by virtual interactions. Social media represent an 
effective and popular communication channel for everyone: people use this channel to 
communicate and follow their favorite artists because of a sense of belonging and a deep emotional 
engagement; it is usual that the same attitude occur towards brands (Turri et al., 2013). In particular, 
customers comply with a set of shared values and do not respect economic utility theories; even 
though, repeated repurchases is one of the advantages of brand advocacy. 
It could be useful to introduce certain metrics that allow an evaluation of brand advocacy, 
especially in social media contexts. Regarding this topic, Wallace et al. (2014) noticed that “likes” 
on Facebook, number of fans and “word of mouse” can represent an interesting way to measure 
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emotional engagement. The “advocates” will like the brand and share their experience with other 
users belonging to the same community; furthermore, a brand that has a high number of fans on 
Facebook is likely to be considered a reliable and appreciated purchasing choice. The same authors 
provided some managerial advices that should be adopted by the company in this virtual context: 
companies should encourage conversations around the brand and cultivate relationships with 
engaged customers; ultimately, these last ones will convince other people belonging to the same 
network.  
Brand advocacy is not only an online concept; those mechanisms work in online and offline 
contexts. The point is that companies should nurture brand trust and identification: customers that 
have a positive purchase experience will trust companies and will start to feel themselves as an 
active part of the brand; this identification will lead an interaction with other potential customer 
that will likely buy the product (Becerra & Badrinarayanan, 2013). People trust brand advocates 
because of two simple reasons: they know that advocates had a direct experience with purchased 
product and they do not have any reward for supporting the company; they do this because of a 
spontaneous engagement. 
 
Finally, considerations about customers segments, channels and brand advocacy match perfectly 
customerization approach. Nowadays, customer should be placed at the center of every marketing 
strategy and BM: they are more powerful and can trigger a high level of influence because of rise 
of social media, advent of digital technologies; but, especially, because of the increased importance 
of social dimension in purchasing process. 
 
2.3.3 The revenue model 
 
In the end, company has to be sure that the BM applied generates the cash flow needed to reinvest 
in resources and activities. In this phase, it is important to decide which is the best way to obtain 
revenues; for instance, if it is better to place advertising or exploit inner quality of the 
product/service provided. In the ICT literature, there are four main revenue models, widely adopted 
by the most successful companies: 
 
- Advertising: during the dot-com bubble, many companies, in exchange of money, allowed 
to other companies (advertisers) ad placements on the software provided by the former 
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company; this model showed some problems and contributed to the failure of many 
companies. This does not mean that advertising is not the right way, many companies 
exploit this source of revenue; the point is that companies should try to apply the model in 
a smart way. For instance, Google showed the concrete advantages stemming from 
advertising: this company provided services for free but placed ads on these ones; in this 
case, advertisers paid to appear in the top positions of search engine results (Marín de la 
Iglesia & Labra Gayo, 2009). 
 
- Freemium: this is a very common strategy in mobile and PC software industries. ICT 
companies know that, usually, there are two distinct customer segments: the ones that want 
to enjoy a basic version of the software for free and people willing to pay a fee to obtain a 
software with extra functions. Essentially, companies, through flows obtained by people 
that adopt the premium version, are able to repay the missed revenues of the users that enjoy 
software for free (Marín de la Iglesia & Labra Gayo, 2009).  
 
- Mass collaboration: in this case, companies provide services for free with the condition that 
these services will remain free in the future (Marín de la Iglesia & Labra Gayo, 2009); this 
principle matches the so-called “gift economy”, an economy that works under free 
exchange of something valuable without immediate rewards (Cheal, 1988). Open-source 
movement is a tangible example that works with mass collaboration principle (Barbrook, 
1998); Wikipedia is a great example as well. This dictionary works on mutual sharing of 
information between users that are providers and consumers at the same time. Despite free 
exchange of goods, mass collaboration represents a revenue model often based on 
donations: users are satisfied with services offered by Wikipedia, hence they will gladly 
make donations (www.wikipedia.org). 
 
- “Razor-razor blade model”: this revenue model is very common in manufacturing 
industries. Principle is simple: companies price razors less (fixed part) and price razor 
blades (variable part) more. Essentially, in these situations, it is always possible to identify: 
a good that can be reused many times after the purchase and a good that is consumed after 
the use (Teece, 2010). 
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2.3.4 Cost innovation 
 
There are always expenses and costs that affect the BM and, at the same time, are necessary to run 
it. The majority of the companies put many efforts in minimizing expenses and in making cost 
structure more efficient; even though, they do not think that cost structure could represent part of 
the innovative process itself. If, usually, companies experience a notable increase in costs because 
of innovations; nowadays, especially start-ups, are trying to innovate limiting overall costs and 
investments. 
 
Williamson (2010) pointed out that, recently, companies established in emerging countries are 
exploiting their cost advantages to offer a higher level of utility for a lower price. This phenomenon 
is called “cost innovation”, an innovation that is focused on the cost structure of a BM. 
Nowadays, Chinese small companies are contributing to a larger production scales through 
participating in global integrated network; through this structure, firms do not have to face a direct 
competition with multinational companies (Zeng & Williamson, 2007). Asian companies applied 
the principle of “modularization of manufacturing”. Nowadays, suppliers of car manufacturing 
companies tend to produce all the components and group them into families (called in this case 
modules) that later will be assembled by car manufacturers; for instance, some fundamental 
modules are suspension, seats, engines or doors (Christensen, 2011). Through modularity, 
companies are able to ensure a good level of standardization and flexibility simultaneously; in fact, 
the customization and application of latest technologies is moved at the end of the value chain, 
while standardization is kept at earliest stages. 
 
According to Williamson (2010), cost innovation disrupts three main economic principles: 
 
- To produce sophisticated technologies, it is necessary to bear high costs: Chinese 
companies are developing niche technologies which are sold at a very competitive price; 
e.g. they are able to save costs relying on low-cost servers. 
 
- Customers who want a high level of variety, have to pay a premium price: many companies 
are trying to develop products in different versions that are sold with a little variation in 
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prices; therefore, customers can afford a good variety of products without paying an 
excessive price. 
 
- In the markets, it is possible to identify niche products, because offered to small customer 
segments, and mass products offered to wide customer segments: Asian companies, thanks 
to their lower costs, managed to sell niche products in mass markets at a convenient price; 
competitors could not react because of huge losses they would have borne and large sunk 
costs. 
 
It is crucial to point out that cost innovation does not regard a geographical cost advantage that is 
difficult to be imitated by foreign companies; but it represents an innovative way to manage cost 
structure and pricing mechanisms. 
 
To reply challenges introduced by cost innovation, companies could settle partnerships with other 
companies that adopted this cost structure; in this way, companies are able to acquire the open-
minded vision embedded in this paradigm (Zeng & Williamson, 2007). Companies should try to 
provide more utility at lower price. They could focus on those core functions of the products and 
eliminate all those functions that are not really important or outsource product design activities to 
those companies that apply cost innovation. Finally, they should try to overcome the three 
challenges, introduced before, by maximizing value for money (the utility stemming from the 
product considering price paid during the transaction) (Williamson, 2010). 
 
2.3.5 Towards a more collaborative approach 
 
Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010), introducing the key partnership building block, dealt with reasons 
under the collaboration with outside partners. This paragraph is aimed to point out which are the 
most collaborative relationships and which are the core features that ensure a good control system 
and achievement of objectives in collaborations. 
 
The ability to manage collaborations is very important because they allow to cope with external 
environment and manage in a proper way all the activities underlying the value chain; however, in 
the end, companies need to translate all the potential advantages of  collaborations in concrete value 
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(Ng et al., 2013). Tuten & Urban (2001) affirm that there are three important features that should 
be always present in a partnership: attributes of partnership, features of the collaborations like 
commitment or trust issues; behavior in communication and quality; characteristics of information 
exchanged; dispute resolution methods, necessary to prevent eventual conflicts among partners. 
Ultimately, companies, which want to build successful relationships, have to ensure commitment, 
trust among partners and a transparent communication; furthermore, even though formal 
partnerships still prevail on informal partnerships, these last ones provide more flexibility and 
lower costs (Tuten & Urban, 2001). 
 
Collaborative agreements with partners can vary depending on characteristics of value proposition; 
for instance, products are different from services, the latter ones are characterized by an intangible 
and perishable nature (Vargo & Lusch, 2004). In service context, partnership should be set 
selecting the right partners that seem more trustworthy: in fact, trust can turn a transactional 
relationship in a long-term collaboration (Kedia & Lahiri, 2007). Finally, an effective partnership 
design goes through a review of the entire BM; flexibility and focus on the objectives can ensure 
that companies, collaborating with partners, can generate and enhance value creation (Chaurey et 
al., 2012). 
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2.3.6 The redesigned framework 
 
Figure 6 represents all the components of the redesigned BM for start-ups in ICT. 
 
Figure 6 – The new Business Model 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
First, companies decide the right target of the marketing strategy considering the empowerment of 
users in ICT context; then, they are ready to set the proper value proposition that will be delivered 
through the right channels. Finally, firms adopt all those necessary moves to turn customers into 
spontaneous advocates of the brand. The entire process occurs in integrated way under 
customerization perspective. 
 
Secondly, company has to manage all the activities in BM, exploiting the right skills and 
capabilities; this is paramount to create and develop resources difficult to be imitated over time 
(Lockett et al., 2009). This guarantees an operational feasibility of what is been decided in 
marketing plan. 
 
45 
 
Thirdly, it is crucial to choose the right revenue model that will depend on customer needs and 
product/service features. The choice is not limited to the four models suggested in the thesis, even 
though, they are the most common in literature and in business practice. 
 
Fourthly, all the activities and resources generate costs. Under OI perspective, these costs can be 
managed in certain ways aimed to exploit innovation and an enhanced value creation and delivery. 
 
Finally, all these processes require a careful look to internal and external environment; companies 
are not self-sufficient and set relationship with outside actors that can belong to value chain 
(suppliers, distributors etc.) or not (universities). The entire value creation process, especially in 
ICT companies, passes through network management, which should be conducted opening the 
boundaries between company and environment; for this reason, networking will be the core 
argument of the next chapter. 
 
2.4 The Business Model Innovation 
 
BM cannot be decided once and left unchanged for a long time; it has a dynamic nature that 
explains why it is important to guarantee changes in and, sometimes, of BM.  
To start an innovative process of the BM adopted brings out many challenges: external ones, 
regarding trust issues in network management or knowledge sharing flows and internal ones, 
regarding organizational resistance or persistence of methods and routines (Berglund & Sandström, 
2013). In fact, internal factors like organizational inertia can really contribute to hinder a BM 
change; for this reason, companies have to decide if it is better a gradual or an immediate transition 
of the framework (Wirtz et al., 2016). 
 
Entrepreneurs need to exploit their leadership skills to drive this evolution, even though, they 
should adopt a strict collaboration with management, which will be accountable for lead employees 
throughout the organization (Doz & Kosonen, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, Doz & Kosonen (2010) argue that these skills are useful to foster the capabilities, 
which every company should own and develop: 
- Strategic sensitivity: attention and consciousness of strategic evolutions; 
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- Leadership unity: speed and effectiveness of top managers in decisional processes; 
 
- Resource fluidity: ability to promote a reconfiguration of skills and resource deployment. 
 
In addition, BMs should pursue an “eternal” flexibility, in terms of market positioning and 
satisfaction of customer needs. Through redesigning activities and configuring resources, 
companies are able to align themselves to the external environment and, ultimately, to customers 
(Mason & Mouzas, 2012). As in the case of VRIN model, BM should be hard to be imitated. In his 
paper, Teece (2010) affirms that a BM is hard to be replicated if: the company has unique resources 
or activities that embody specific skills, there is a level of obscurity that hides mechanisms under 
BM implementation, introducing a BM can cannibalize sales or profits. Flexibility should be rooted 
in an internal dynamic consistency: in this way, companies are able to adapt themselves to external 
environment and, contemporarily, maintain coherence and stability in BM (Demil & Lecocq, 
2010). In pursuing consistency, management has a crucial role: it should spot and analyze all those 
risks that could have a considerable impact on BM; in this way, it can anticipate challenges 
stemming from internal and external environment; finally, tactics and objectives can be 
implemented in an effective way (Demil & Lecocq, 2010). 
 
Hacklin et al. (2018) argue that value migration in industry and across firms is an important factor 
that affects the way to effectively compete within market and sustain BM: usually, in high-tech 
industries, value is concentrated in those firms that perform better than others do. Once new 
companies, because of inner skills and resources or supported by technological changes, enter the 
industry and perform better than incumbent firms, provoke a migration of the value in the industry 
from worst performers to best performers. Furthermore, in industries characterized by high value 
migration, companies should adopt a proactive behavior and innovate their BM in the case of low 
value migration industries, companies should set another new BM to capture additional value 
(Hacklin et al., 2018).    
 
Finally, BMI is set under a networking perspective; as said before, the only way to survive is to 
change BM depending on external and internal environment. It is not a case that many papers point 
out how networking is an important tool that has to be taken in consideration when designing and 
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innovating BM (Berglund & Sandström, 2013; Demil & Lecocq, 2010; Mason & Mouzas, 2012; 
Teece, 2010). Start-ups belonging to ICT industry tend to satisfy a demand that is not local, but 
global; this depends on the virtual nature of products and services provided which guarantee low 
costs and high speed. The companies that want to undertake an internationalization process are 
used to rely on external partners, in fact, they need resources and skills that cannot develop 
internally; many of them tend to adopt a co-opetitive approach (Kock et al., 2010). In addition, 
collaboration with other companies is optimal when start-ups have to manage a complex product 
development process that usually characterizes an internationalization path (Gnyawali & Park, 
2009). 
For all these reasons, this hypothesis is posited: 
 
H1: Start-ups that are changing their Business Model to enter foreign markets and establishing a 
global competitive position can experience a positive impact on financial performance if they set 
a collaboration with other companies. 
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CHAPTER 3 - NETWORKING 
 
3.1 A quick definition of the concept 
 
Environment is a source of uncertainty and instability that should be managed carefully by 
companies; nevertheless, companies set relationships to cope with environment and merely to 
survive in their markets (Berglund & Sandström, 2013).  
Nowadays, many companies are engaging in collaborative relationships aimed to pursue 
competitive advantage through the sharing of knowledge and resources as well (Romero & Molina, 
2011). 
Networking includes several mechanisms that influence the firm at many levels. In particular, 
Vanhaverbeke (2006) argues that, in an OI context, there are three distinct levels of impact by 
networks on company. 
 
Firstly, an intra-organizational level analyzes the internal mechanisms within the company that 
create and transmit the knowledge. There is a clear distinction between tacit knowledge, the 
knowledge that is embedded in employees and cannot be easily codified; and the explicit 
knowledge, embedded in codified mechanisms like routines and that can be transmitted to other 
people (Lagerström & Andersson, 2003). In the same paper, there is a clear identification of the 
teams as the core actors accountable of the transmission of knowledge through proper methods; 
overcoming common challenges like cultural barriers or diverse backgrounds. 
 
Secondly, there is a company level that has been stressed before in the previous chapter on the OI 
framework (Chesbrough, 2003). 
 
Thirdly, there is an inter-organizational level. This is the broader level that analyzes the way the 
companies manage their relationships with external companies, often on a global scale. Companies 
can build informal or formal ties and wide or deep ties; the choices are based on the strategy and 
objectives (Vanhaverbeke, 2006).  
 
Formal ties regard formalized forms of collaborations among partners willing to exchange skills 
and resources to reach a mutual advantage (Parker, 2008). Parker, in his paper (2008), argues that 
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there are some prerequisites in creating a formal business network, in particular: they work better 
in a prosperous environment full of innovative flows, they should be performed with a proper 
incentive system that penalizes free riders; finally, urban areas should fit better networks than rural 
areas. If all these features “put the spotlight” on the main positive indirect effects of the formal 
networks on the company growth; Schoonjans et al. (2013), taking in consideration a sample of 
SMEs included in PLATO (a program introduced by Flemish government to support SMEs), 
demonstrated that there is a direct effect between business network and firm growth. In particular, 
formal networks support the company for an acquisition of resources that can balance the inner 
size limits of the companies. Finally, it is crucial to transform all the collective benefits generated 
by the business networks in personal benefits of the company: companies that are actively focused 
in improving the collective interests of the formal network are aware that improvements in 
networks turn into improvement in the single companies belonging to the network (Munksgaard & 
Medlin, 2014). 
 
In the case of informal ties, it is important to build a background, managed by trust and harmony, 
that ensures good communication and a proper distribution of power among partners; it is also true 
that these tools boost free knowledge flows within the network (Rampersad et al., 2010). Informal 
collaborations match perfectly the OI practices: informal ties foster the openness of company 
towards the various outside partners like universities, laboratories or companies (Brunswicker & 
Ehrenmann, 2013). The company is the main character of the so-called “co-opetition”, the 
collaboration among companies that compete and, at the same time, cooperate (Mention, 2011). 
This phenomenon is very common in ICT industries: companies use this form of collaboration to 
build expensive infrastructures and get access to core resources; if “co-opetition” promotes many 
advantages, it is also true that it involves complex dynamics and many conflicts that partners need 
to manage in advance (Gnyawali & Park, 2011).  
 
Deep ties are characterized by a repetitive nature of knowledge flows, while the wide ties are 
characterized by a heterogeneous nature of information. This explains why, depending on the 
objectives of the company, deep ties are more likely to drive incremental innovations; while wide 
ties are more likely to stimulate radical innovations (Vanhaverbeke, 2006). 
 
51 
 
Open source software industry is a good example of how networks (communities in this case) are 
able to build products satisfying the customers’ needs. Open source software are software, which 
code is freely available worldwide (Henkel, 2006); in this context, users are crucial in developing 
new innovative ideas. Communities are characterized by the presence of diverse people born in 
different cultures and that acquired ICT skills in an amateur way; their final aim is to provide 
solutions to solve certain emerging needs without expecting necessarily something in exchange 
(Rajala et al., 2012). Rajala et al. (2012) discovered two important aspects that are shaped by the 
networks: 
 
- Resources management: the capabilities emerging from the networks and the nature of these 
relationships, both external and internal, prompt a right reconfiguration of resources to 
achieve business strategy; 
- Flexibility: if communication and trust are important also in this situation, networks 
promote a flexible structure of the business that matches needs of the external environment. 
 
3.2 Collaborative strategies and impact on performance 
 
The creation of the networks represents the last stage of a process that requires an open strategy of 
the company when it takes decisions regarding collaborative interactions. In setting the 
collaborations, there are three preliminary decisions: the breadth (the different nature of the 
partners belonging to the network, e.g.. University or customer); the depth (the intensity of the 
collaborations); the spatial distribution (the geographical distances among the partners) (Sedita & 
Apa, 2016). Before analyzing more in depth these three factors, it is worth to mention that it is 
crucial to decide in a proper way the right partners, guaranteeing that the connectivity among 
partners is kept or even improved over time (Wilson, 2012). 
 
Breadth cannot be fully understood without a specific analysis of the kind of partners that can 
interact with the company; partners that have different strategic objectives and that can influence 
the company strategy in different ways. 
 
University is one of the most preferred partners of the company. It has an important role in terms 
of knowledge transfer and competencies: companies interact with university because they want to 
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acquire certain specific academic ideas that can drive innovations and, contemporarily, enhance 
the skills of the company; furthermore, universities provide various services aimed to the 
commercialization of a product or to co-creation initiatives (Ivascu et al., 2016). Those interactions 
between university and company can seriously harm the “academic freedom”: business objectives 
can drive the direction of academic research towards more empirical than theoretical research 
fields. Furthermore, projects undertaken by both parties should benefit companies and university 
as well; the only way to obtain this mutual advantage is embedded in a trade-off between how 
much joint projects are challenging and how much they affect business performance (Perkmann & 
Walsh, 2009). This is linked with the comparison among academic collaboration and 
commercialization. In the first case, it is important to focus on engagement and skills expressed on 
an individual level because it is demonstrated that, in this case, often individual expertise does not 
imply a collective expertise (university). In the second case, in dealing with commercialization, it 
is crucial to adopt a collective perspective because individual impact is not significant (Perkmann 
et al., 2013). The concept is simple: academic collaborations are supported more by individual 
features of the best researchers, while commercialization processes are more linked to 
organizational structure, so to collective mechanisms. 
Ankrah et al. (2013) underlined the importance of creating a win-win relationship between 
companies and universities. This can be done only if there is an exploitation of complementary 
benefits that both actors provide: universities can provide their expertise and infrastructure to 
support innovative process; while companies can provide training to students and researchers and 
career opportunities to newly graduated students. Knowledge transmission works if there is a 
cognitive closeness that allows to both partners to obtain and use the knowledge in their respective 
business (Heikkilä & Heikkilä, 2013). For this reason, knowledge transfers work better in informal 
relationships: in this case, the higher frequency of interactions, the transmission of tacit knowledge 
and high level of trust are able to leverage and support a successful collaboration (Liew et al., 
2013). Finally, university gives an important contribution in boosting the complementary strengths 
of companies and other universities; in meeting specific business needs in specialized fields; in 
sustaining a balanced national economic growth. Nevertheless, in the literature, some authors think 
that universities are not able to respond immediately to needs expressed by the companies; lack of 
specific business capabilities, bureaucratic costs and financial limits contribute to harm the benefits 
of an academic collaboration (Wilson, 2012). Incubators are able to offer services that offset these 
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limits expressed by universities, like financial support, business support and networking services. 
For this reason, these companies will be introduced and explained deeply in the next paragraph.  
 
Surely, collaborative strategies with customers are the best choice that many companies adopt 
when dealing with OI (Enkel & Gassmann, 2007); it is not a case that this kind of strategy is 
reported in many OI articles (Henkel, 2006; King & Lakhani, 2013; Parida & Örtqvist, 2015; 
Enkel & Gassmann, 2007).  
Nowadays, companies are replacing their firm-centric view with a customer-centric view; in 
particular, usually, companies interact with customers to design and develop new product. In 
particular, co-creation practices are often applied with individual customers and, for this reason, 
it is necessary to adopt a dynamic and flexible approach depending on the interaction between 
company and customer. The need of a more customized experience matches exactly the so-called 
“mass customization” (high scale production aimed to minimize cost and, at the same time, to 
satisfy a unique group of customers) (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). 
Yi & Gong (2013) identify four stages that characterize customer behavior throughout co-creation 
process: 
 
- Information seeking: initially, customers try to gather information aimed to understand 
better the products or services offered by the company and to have a better performance in 
co-creation process; 
- Information sharing: this stage ensures that customers are able to communicate their needs 
to the employees of the company; 
- Responsible behavior: customer should recognize their duties and their accountabilities 
towards the company; 
- Personal interaction: it is necessary to establish an interaction between customers and 
employees to exploit completely value stemming from co-creation. 
 
If customers play an important role in guaranteeing a good effectiveness of collaborative strategies, 
companies should take care of those conditions that influence outcomes of the strategies. About 
this topic, Kristensson et al. (2008) express some important thoughts. Firstly, there is an 
identification of the various roles embodied by the customers in this experience and the context in 
which the customer is immersed. Secondly, companies should give some specific tools that support 
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the customers in co-creation, setting also a proper incentive system that does not necessarily regard 
financial rewards (as stressed before, many times, customers collaborate because they are interested 
in finding specific solutions in specific fields). Thirdly, companies, in constructing the 
collaborative strategies, should replicate a daily context and should not underestimate the limited 
expertise of the customer; in fact, it is demonstrated that customers that already have specific 
knowledge in specific fields are less likely to drive disruptive innovation. Fourthly, companies 
should prefer a heterogeneous group of customers to stimulate proactive discussions and reliable 
decisions. 
Even if a strategy focused on customer satisfaction is usual and is been applied in many markets, 
co-design activities between customers and firms are been applied only recently. This trend 
depends on the difficulty in choosing the proper governance systems that ensures control and value 
generation, furthermore consumer is been conceived always as receiver at the end of the innovative 
process. In the end, everyone recognized academic validity of co-creation practices but few 
companies applied this strategy in the market (Sanders & Stappers, 2008). 
Roberts et al. (2014) argue that customers willing to collaborate with customers can be pushed by 
intrinsic or extrinsic outcomes: in the first case, consumers want to collaborate for egoistic or other 
personal reasons; for instance, because they are disappointed about some products or they have 
unsatisfied needs. In the second case, customers are driven by an external outcomes (often 
economically desirable); for instance, because they expect to receive a monetary reward or a career 
opportunity within the company. In the same paper, it is introduced a kind of outcome that lies in-
between the extrinsic and intrinsic dimension. Here, customers that rely on these outcomes want to 
collaborate because they expect back a social recognition as an active part of the community; in 
particular, if there is an external reward regarding the membership to a group, there is an increase 
in personal satisfaction and self-esteem. 
 
Even if the most common forms of collaboration involve universities or customers, companies 
operating in dynamic industries usually rely on other forms of collaboration; for instance, they 
cooperate with consultants, suppliers or competitors, like in the case of co-opetition phenomenon 
(Figure 7 summarizes all the main possible interactions among companies and partners). According 
to Barratt (2004), companies should not ignore the internal collaboration but, instead, place it at 
the same level of the external collaboration. Furthermore, he argues that companies should select 
accurately the partners and, with them, build a closer relationship; nevertheless, throughout the 
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paper, it is underlined that choices about the nature of partners and intensity of relationship are 
susceptible to industry and company features. 
In ICT industries, companies adopt an OI approach in a natural way due to the competitive drivers 
and knowledge intensity in the sector; this does not deny that company should be careful in sharing 
knowledge with outside partners; on the contrary, openness in collaborations has a wider scope that 
comprehends also these safeguards. In fact, an open approach: can boost the effectiveness of 
internal R&D expenses (Drechsler & Natter, 2012); has a direct positive effect on firm performance 
(Eisingerich et al., 2010); especially in service industries, can deeply affect innovation processes 
at many steps (Love et al., 2011). 
 
                                       Figure 7 – Main collaborative strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          Source: Barratt (2004) 
 
 
Summarizing all the considerations taken before, the following hypotheses are posited: 
 
H2: Under an Open Innovation perspective, companies will adopt the openness principle in 
forming collaborations; that is, a company that adopts one type of collaboration will be more likely 
to adopt other types of collaboration. 
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H3a: Collaborations have a direct positive impact on the financial performance of companies. 
 
H3b: Collaborations with customers and suppliers will show a greater impact than other types of 
collaborations on the firm performance. 
 
3.3 Role of incubators and networking services 
 
Surely, collaborative strategies play an important role in reaching strategic objectives and financial 
growth; furthermore, in the case of start-ups, these services are crucial to mitigate the “liability of 
smallness”. In fact, these firms, through collaborative strategies, are able to exploit big networks 
that, in turn, are able to offset the limited internal size, encouraging a reciprocal exchange of skills 
and resources.  
Nevertheless, start-ups face also a “liability of newness”, for this reason, these “newborn” 
companies need to interact with other actors that are specialized in providing business services at 
earlier stages of company life cycle; the business incubators (Sedita & Apa, 2016). 
 
According to Bergek & Norrman (2008), a business incubator can be conceived as a supportive 
background addressed to start-ups and other companies at earlier stages; in particular, they usually 
provide the following services: 
 
- Additional office spaces rented to companies for business meetings; 
- A group of services aimed to reduce the overall costs and finance companies; 
- Professional support, training and coaching activities; 
- External and/or internal networking activities. 
 
Basically, incubators are able to provide “hard” and “soft” services: the first category regards all 
those facilities and resources that are provided to aid companies; while the second category regards 
all those technical or organizational activities provided to encourage sharing and creation of 
knowledge flows (Zhigao et al., 2006). In ICT industries, knowledge is the main good that is 
exchanged among different actors. Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) facilitate 
knowledge sharing eliminating many constraints like time, speed and location; if it is true that these 
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technologies have wider scope, they need to exploit internet infrastructure to be effective 
(Hendriks, 1999).  
Business incubators topic is been always discussed by institutions in deciding economic policies; 
like universities, incubators have an important public role in boosting the entire national economy. 
It is not a coincidence that the majority of the incubators are no-profit businesses (Tavoletti, 2013). 
For instance, business incubators (especially public ones) contribute to employment, alleviation of 
poverty, technology creation and transfer (Masutha & Rogerson, 2015). Incubator does not 
represent a substitute to entrepreneurial activity. It is a propeller able to foster entrepreneurial 
activity and encourage an overall economic growth, through provision of services and facilities 
(Lesáková, 2012).  
For this reason, another two hypotheses are proposed:  
 
H4a: Entering a business incubator experience has a positive effect on the firm financial 
performance. 
 
H4b: The effect of the incubation experience on the firm financial performance is mediated by the 
entrepreneurial capabilities of the founder. 
 
In literature, there are many different deployments of incubator archetypes depending on the 
criteria of segmentation adopted by authors. Barbero et al. (2012) identified four main incubator 
archetypes: basic research incubator (aimed to development and commercialization of technologies 
through Intellectual Property), university business incubator (supported by university and company 
funds), economic development incubator (public organizations focused on wide economic 
objectives) and private incubators (private and corporate objectives). Taking in consideration a 
Spanish sample of incubators, they found out that: private and basic research incubators meet 
standard goals of the archetype they belong; university business incubators quite meet these goals; 
while economic development incubators do not meet these criteria at all. 
 
High-tech markets have some peculiarities compared, for instance, to low-tech markets: in fact, the 
first ones are characterized by a more fragmented competitive structure; dynamic and disruptive 
evolution of technologies; high level of globalization. In these markets, companies compete on a 
physical level (formed by resources exchanged) and on a virtual level (formed by information 
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exchanged) (Rayport & Sviokla, 1995). In setting strategic objectives, company should consider 
that the only way to compete effectively on both level is to focus on value creation; this implies a 
creation and maintenance of innovative networks that leverage existing complementarities between 
physical resources and intangible assets (Laubacher et al., 1998). Furthermore, companies, in 
managing innovative collaborations, should nurture their absorptive capacity, which depends on 
frequent interactions with partners, past experience and, finally, by incubator itself (Sedita et al., 
2019). In fact, company, collaborating with incubators, could overcome the lack of personal and 
relational skills that, in turn, encourage an effective and fruitful interaction between company and 
partner.  
An important tool, which can rescue ICT start-ups and provide core services to reach these goals, 
is the virtual incubator: an internet-based incubator that, through provision of networking services 
and web resources, helps companies across the value creation path (Nowak & Grantham, 2000). 
These for-profit incubators have a stable online presence that allows exploiting all the services and 
networking activities; as the name suggests, they lack of a stable physical location and operate 
worldwide through web channels (Von Zedtwitz & Grimaldi, 2006). 
It seems that virtual incubators are able to capture some advantages that are missed by other types 
of incubator like university business incubators; in turn, the latters are able to capture advantages 
missed by the former ones. Carayannis & Von Zedtwitz (2005), in their paper, argue that there is 
a tool able to overcome respective limits and boost advantages of real and virtual incubators; the 
so-called GloCal, Real & Virtual Incubator Network (G-RVIN), where GloCal are global and local 
networking infrastructures. G-RVINs can be defined as “…knowledge and innovation infra-
structure and infra-technology which would link entrepreneurs and micro-entrepreneurs with 
local, regional, and global networks of customers, suppliers and complementors and thus help not 
only bridge, but also leverage, the diverse divides…” (Carayannis & Von Zedtwitz, 2005, p.109). 
In the same paper, it is underlined how these networks are able to connect segments, 
communicating only through physical channels and exploiting web-based connectivity devices; at 
the same time, these unique network ties encourage and leverage classic geographical proximity. 
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Figure 8 – The three stages of incubation 
 
 
 
                         
                       
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Finally, it is important to point out that incubation does not represent the only stage involved in the 
entire incubation process; incubators should take care of all those useful activities performed before 
(pre-incubation) and after (post-incubation) the actual provision of services to clients (Figure 8).  
During pre-incubation stage, incubators can provide facilities, test the entrepreneurial abilities of 
the company or support the company in drawing up the business plan (Lalkaka, 2003; Sonne, 
2012); furthermore, they can provide tools that can be used by founder to test their skills and 
competencies (Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005). 
During post-incubation stage, incubators need to nurture the relationship with customers and 
guarantee a mutual assistance (Lalkaka, 2003); they need to check that companies reached their 
predetermined objectives and a quite stable financial independence (Al-mubaraki & Busler, 2013). 
In performing all those preliminary and consequent activities, incubators need a constant and 
tangible support by government and related policies (Adegbite, 2001).  
 
Networking activities are one of the most important services that a business incubator provides to 
a start-up; it is useful to discover which are those elements that show the difference between a good 
or a bad incubator performance. Cooper et al. (2012), in their paper, analyzed an awarded university 
business incubator to find out which are the main performance drivers that justify a good 
networking interaction with start-ups. They identified four influential factors: 
 
Incubation stage 
Pre-incubation stage Post-incubation stage 
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- Formal or informal interaction: it is important to decrease the formal distance between 
companies and incubators; the first starting point is to create an informal and trustworthy 
collaboration. 
 
- Social assistance: start-ups want to be considered as part of a community, because this 
relationship can simplify resource sharing and assistance. 
 
- Impact of firm stage: stage of the company is able to reshape the frequency, the strength 
and the kind of collaborative relationship. 
 
- Geographical closeness: even if interaction with partners is aided by telecommunication 
and technologies (see virtual incubator), a physically close interaction encourages a better 
communication with start-ups; in addition, it ensures trust between parties and tacit 
knowledge sharing. 
 
3.4 The Network Ability 
 
It is widely recognized a particular ability, within the company, aimed to manage and set 
networking relationships with other external actors; if this ability is been often associated to 
network management concept, nowadays, there is a vast literature about the Network Ability (NA) 
(Ritter et al., 2004). The latter, even if it incorporates elements contained in network management, 
comprises other individual and organizational elements. The NA can be defined as “an individual-
level skill, defined as the ability to develop friendships and build strong, beneficial alliances and 
coalitions” (Sigmund et al., 2015, p.266). This capability represents the main prerequisite to 
generate successful innovations; in fact, inclusion of outside partners encourages a fruitful 
generation of innovative ideas, an effective implementation and commercialization of the product 
(Konsti-Laakso et al., 2012). Start-ups, due to their young age, face the so-called liability of 
newness (already defined previously) that hinders a perfect integration within the network; NA can 
offset this weakness and encourage an entry in bigger and more attractive networks, in fact, these 
networks can provide those core resources that companies cannot obtain by themselves (Semrau & 
Sigmund, 2012). Hence, NA contributes to offset liability of newness and liability of smallness as 
well. 
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Carnabuci & Operti (2013) argue that knowledge flows and organizational implications are two 
components that can affect output stemming from NA. In particular, often, companies, recombining 
technologies in certain ways, are able to come up with new innovations depending on knowledge 
background; companies that have similar background will be likely to generate innovations through 
recombining existing technologies, while the ones that have a different background will be likely 
to promote a recombination of new technologies. The point is the following: companies with 
similar backgrounds will explore ideas belonging to the same research field in which they are 
specialized; while companies with diverse ones will explore disruptive ideas that belong to new 
research fields. Regarding organizational implications, start-ups could prefer using informal 
structures because of less restrictions and complexities that can arise from a formal structure; 
nevertheless, informal structure can exhibit control issues regarding, for instance, rules systems 
and procedures (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013). In SMEs, entrepreneurs represent a bridge between 
internal and external knowledge flows. In this regard, Corno et al. (2014) introduced the figure of 
the “Knowledge Intensive Entrepreneur”, an entrepreneur of a SME that is focalized in exploring, 
innovating or decoding external knowledge. Furthermore, this entrepreneur occupies a significant 
position in rendering innovation economically, because of his/her dynamic attitude and leadership 
skills. Moreover, Shu et al. (2017), in their paper, stressed the importance of the entrepreneur’s 
Network Ability; through his/her competencies the founder can set interpersonal relationships 
based on trust which, in turn, can encourage reciprocal exchange of tacit knowledge. The same 
authors affirm that four dimensions describe NA effectively: 
 
- Network orientation: this factor argues with the social openness and trust that entrepreneurs 
employ in these kinds of collaboration; 
 
- Network building: this factor regards the effort put by entrepreneur in extending networking 
relationship, finding new information about partners; 
 
- Network maintenance: entrepreneurs have to nurture and support the relationship adopting 
a long-term perspective; 
 
- Network coordination: to manage all the relationships that he/she built, entrepreneur has to 
adopt an integrated approach that secures an optimal level of coordination. 
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Shu et al. (2017) demonstrated that the NA, through the impact of these four components, affects 
positively the chance to find unexplored opportunities in the market; effect that is mediated by 
power distance (the extent to which a boss can establish the attitude of his/her subordinate3). In 
addition, Sigmund et al. (2015) demonstrated that NA has a direct positive effect in increasing 
financial performance of the company; this impact is explained by the capability to set bigger 
networks that involve powerful collaborative relationships. 
 
Thus, this hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H5: Network Ability has a positive impact on the financial performance of the company. The impact 
will be measured looking at all the components of network ability: network orientation, network 
building, network maintenance and network coordination. 
 
3.4.1 The complementary role of absorptive capacity 
 
Someone may argue that NA is very close to the so-called absorptive capacity; even though, if the 
two concepts are compared, important differences emerge. 
Cohen & Levinthal (1990) introduced this term in their paper, when dealing with learning and 
innovative mechanisms. In particular, they defined absorptive capacity as the “ability to recognize 
the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (p.128). This capacity 
reflects on individual and organizational level as well; in addition, it depends on the previous 
knowledge background, in fact, knowledge, once stored in memory, will allow to interpret and 
capture the outside information (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive capacity is strictly related 
to R&D investments: companies that invest a significant amount in R&D are able to build 
knowledge background needed to spot outside knowledge and capture the value stemming from it 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). 
The importance of knowledge flows represents a similarity with NA, where, even if there is a 
networking context, outside knowledge has to be internalized and reused (Carnabuci & Operti, 
2013). Furthermore, whether companies use absorptive capacity or NA, they are focused in 
managing relationships with external environment to generate high value from knowledge flows; 
                                                 
3 Hofstede, G. (1984). Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values, (Vol. 5). Sage. 
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nevertheless, in the knowledge itself there is the limit of absorptive capacity. In fact, absorptive 
capacity is strictly dependent on the knowledge field in which is been built; thus, companies that 
explore novel knowledge fields will not be able to export their knowledge background, hence their 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Under OI, absorptive capacity can overcome its 
own and OI limits; moreover, absorptive capacity can encourage a better network engagement 
(Huang & Rice, 2009). In the same paper, Huang & Rice (2009) affirm that SMEs which have a 
high level of absorptive capacity can experience more benefits in terms of innovation, when 
acquiring a technology externally; this does not mean that absorptive capacity does not imply costs. 
In fact, absorptive capacity is cumulative and “path-dependent” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989); 
investments in this kind of capacity will harm the performance  in the short term and will eventually 
improve the performance in the future, once the knowledge background is been built (Huang & 
Rice, 2009). Absorptive capacity can be considered as a trigger that can improve the overall 
performance; but companies that apply OI principles, even if they do not develop absorptive 
capacity, can successfully manage inbound knowledge flows (Spithoven et al., 2010). 
Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler (2009) affirm that absorptive capacity, even though it is an important 
prerequisite of a good knowledge management, is necessary but not sufficient to manage 
knowledge flows. In particular, this capacity takes care of all those knowledge mechanisms that go 
from outside to inside: companies that invest in absorptive capacity want to gather external 
information that after will be collected in the knowledge background of the company, which, in 
turn, will be used to gather further knowledge. 
 
3.4.2 Deepening the collaboration and choosing proper governance mechanisms 
 
The previous paragraphs were focused on the preliminary stages in which NA arises; in particular, 
how companies interpret and internalize outside knowledge, but also how companies choose 
network partners and extract value generated by the interaction. Now it is important to deal with 
the latter stages of NA like network maintenance and network coordination; during these phases, 
it is important to deepen the relationship and understand which are the right ways to set influence 
mechanisms over partners (Prenkert & Følgesvold, 2014). Reinforcement of network ties 
encourages more emotional and economic support, in addition, partners will be likely to bear all 
risks associated to collaboration in pursuing mutual objectives; finally, in many cases, companies 
that deepen their collaborative relationship turn informal collaborations into deeper collaboration 
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forms like strategic alliance or business partnerships (Barnir & Smith, 2002). Companies that 
frequently interact within each other can get those core resources needed to implement the strategy; 
furthermore, network strength and frequency represent a solution to those difficulties that start-ups 
have to bear in entering a new market, especially if they are assessing an internationalization 
strategy (Chen & Chen, 1998). Companies, once established a consolidated relationship, will gladly 
set face-to-face interactions with their partners; ultimately, this contact method will stimulate a 
reciprocal sharing of tacit knowledge (Chen & Chen, 1998). Start-ups that operate in ICT industries 
tend to prefer a dynamic structure that matches the short life cycle of the product sold or service 
provided; through personal meetings and negotiation processes, these companies are able to 
guarantee trust and a deep interaction as well (Grefen et al., 2009). In addition, Grefen et al. (2009) 
argue that start-ups, in managing their respective networks, prefer to set a collaborative interaction 
that puts all the network partners at the same level of power. Network strength itself could represent 
a governance system: companies that develop their collaborative relationships are able to decrease 
all the collaboration risks and reinforce the collaboration itself (Barnir & Smith, 2002). 
Nevertheless, it is important to determine how the power should be distributed across the partners 
belonging to the network; ultimately, if it is better to adopt an autocratic or a collaborative 
approach. 
In the first case firms use authority as governance mechanism, while, in the second case, they use 
trust as governance mechanism. Authority is the ability to influence the behavior of another person 
to reach specific objectives, while trust is based on the assumption that other partners will not adopt 
an opportunistic behavior, which can harm the company (Snehota & Håkansson, 1995). 
 
Traditionally, within organization it is been always recognized a power pattern aimed to distribute 
power among those who instruct a command and those who has to comply with a formalized system 
of rules; autocratic system is been applied, mainly, within medium or big companies, in which a 
complex bureaucratic structure was needed to run the business (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). 
Nevertheless, in countries like South Korea, within business networks, which comprise mainly 
SMEs; there is a centralized governance system that prioritizes the authority of the national 
government (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). In networking, authority can prevent potential 
opportunistic behavior that cannot be strictly managed through more collaborative approaches. 
Teegen & Doh (2002) introduced the authority balance, a reciprocal approach that justifies the 
control over some networking activities by some partners compensated by control over other 
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activities by other partners; this could represent a good alternative to a pure autocratic approach 
that encourages a medium-high asymmetry of power.  
 
Companies that show a high level of trust, on the contrary, assume that the other partners will 
perform all strategic actions trying to give benefits to the company or, at least, avoiding those 
actions that can harm company performance (Snehota & Håkansson, 1995). Trust is strictly linked 
with depth of collaborative relationships and frequency of interactions with partners; in fact, a 
deepening of the network relationship builds trust over time (Teegen & Doh, 2002). Snehota & 
Håkansson (1995) demonstrated that start-up companies, in setting network relationships to cope 
with external environment, are willing to establish a mixed governance system that includes trust 
and authority as well; furthermore, this system is aimed to guarantee high degrees of control in 
case of significant interdependence among partners.  
It would be interesting to check how this mixed approach (combining trust and authority) would 
affect the collaborative strategies adopted by the start-ups companies; thus, this hypothesis is 
posited: 
 
H6: In conducting network management, companies that adopt autocratic governance system and 
a trust governance system (measured by network strength and frequency) jointly, will experience 
higher degrees of collaborations with their partners. 
 
In the end, NA and its governance mechanisms can affect cultural background of the company and, 
at the same time, they are affected by it; national institutions can determine the efficacy of the 
results stemming from network relationships (Chen & Chen, 1998). Finally, start-ups that 
undertake internationalization strategies should always perform an in-depth cultural analysis of 
countries they are trying to enter. In the next chapter, results and discussions will show how Italian 
situation is affected by institutional and cultural background, these are actually the factors which 
explain why sometimes results comply with literature, while, in other cases, they do not. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE CASE OF ITALIAN INNOVATIVE ICT START-UPS 
 
4.1 Overview of the Italian ICT industry 
 
To measure the innovation performance of countries, Hollanders et al. (2019) introduced the 
“European Innovation Scoreboard”, an indicator, expressed in percent, that comprises four core 
innovative dimensions: framework conditions (human resources or research infrastructure), 
investments (company investments or access to funding), innovation activities (company analysis 
or intellectual property) and impacts (employment or revenues). Depending on the score level, it is 
possible to distinguish four big innovator groups (Figure 9): “innovation leaders” (with a score 
over 120%), “strong innovators” (with a score between 90% and 120%), “moderate innovators” 
(with a score between 50% and 90%) and “modest innovators” (with a score under 50%). To give 
a global view of the variation of score among countries, also non-EU companies are introduced in 
the table below with their respective score (Hollanders et al., 2019). 
 
Figure 9 – Innovation performance of EU and non-EU countries 
Source: Hollander et al. (2019) 
 
Italy (IT) belongs to the category of “moderate innovators”, compared to the one in 2011, its 
performance improved reaching a value equal to 85% in 2018; SMEs internal innovations 
regarding products or processes, encouraged this trend overcoming its weaknesses, like financial 
support or human resources management (Hollanders et al., 2019).  
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Italy comprises a spread industrial system supported mainly by SMEs, which represents the 95% 
of all Italian companies; they are specialized in producing high quality solutions applying advance 
design and engineering techniques; nevertheless, nowadays, Italy is still coping with those negative 
effects arising from the global recession (Corno et al., 2014). These effects reflect on Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). 
 
Figure 10 – Quarterly GDP growth in Italy 
Source: ISTAT (2019) 
 
In this case, GDP is calculated as “sum of the values added by all activities producing goods and 
services, plus taxes less subsidies on products” (ISTAT, 2019, p.4). If, from the second quarter 
until the fourth quarter of 2018, the GDP growth rate has been usually negative, also in the fourth 
quarter itself (-0,1%); in the first quarter of 2019, the rate reached a slightly positive value (+0,1) 
which decreased to 0 in the second quarter (ISTAT, 2019). According to Hassan & Ottaviano 
(2013), Italy is facing a stagnant period in many industrial sectors, especially in ICT industries; 
ICT investments are addressed to those sectors that showed a low total factor productivity. 
Furthermore, Italy did not fit the recent changes needed to cope with digital technologies evolution 
(Hassan & Ottaviano, 2013); for instance, in business service sectors, ICT trend encouraged a 
growth path within the industry, but, after the end of 80s, this growth suddenly stopped (Saltari et 
al., 2013). Saltari et al. (2013) argue that this sudden stop is due to production and managerial 
lacks: at the beginning, this industry exploited the benefits stemming from introduction of digital 
technologies; after, since organizational restructuring and rearrangement of managerial activities 
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did not occur, this positive trend suddenly reached an end. In particular, Hassan and Ottaviano 
(2013) argue that: 
 
- Incentive system within companies is not based on performance; 
 
- Employees are rewarded without a clear correlation between efforts and results; 
 
- People that underperform are not fired; 
 
- Managers do not concentrate on talented people because of a wrong management of 
organizational priorities. 
 
Someone may argue that another limit of Italian economy is the company size itself: larger 
companies own more resources aimed to production activities, furthermore, they can absorb and 
implement external technologies in an easier way (Bugamelli et al., 2018). This could not be an 
exhaustive explanation for the Italian situation: the country does not own an adequate digital 
infrastructure and this lack puts start-ups in an uncomfortable position already at the beginning of 
their life cycle. Moreover, as discussed before, start-ups are not supported by an effective 
educational system; professional bodies, for instance incubators, do not provide core skills and 
capabilities; finally, the majority of the start-ups do not receive adequate external financial support 
which is replaced by self-financing (Corno et al., 2014).   
During 2017, CAGR in Italian digital market grew by 2.3% (Figure 11), outclassing the growth 
rate of the previous year (+2%), in particular, ICT services showed an upward trend as well; cloud 
computing, through an increase in efficiency and effectiveness in management of resources, 
supported the overall growth of this industry (Anitec - Assinform, 2018). 
For what concerns ICT employment, Lasagni (2011) affirms that the link between capital 
investments and human skills is not so clear in this industry, in particular, small companies showed 
a great economic performance with low fixed costs; instead of R&D or capital investments they 
exploited the ability to provide customized solutions to customers.  
 
Finally, it is discussed how, unlike the other industries, employment in ICT industry is not affected 
by regional differences. This does not mean that there are no regions that perform better than others 
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(Lasagni, 2011). Lombardia and Lazio are the regions that show highest market share in the ICT 
market (40.9%), a reason, which could explain this rate, is the surrounding technological 
infrastructures: users and service companies provide a wide range of solutions and, at the same 
time, create a supportive background for technological investments. The residual 59.1 % is 
distributed equally among Piemonte, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna and Toscana (Anitec - Assinform, 
2018). 
 
Figure 11 – The Italian digital market 
Source: Anitec – Assinform (2018) 
 
4.2 Data collection and sampling 
 
The overall aim of the research, conducted in this thesis, is to analyze the impact of the Network 
Ability (NA) on the performance of innovative start-ups operating in the ICT industry in Italy; for 
the sake of this, two questionnaires have been sent to a sample of ICT innovative start-ups located 
in Italy. The first questionnaire comprises 24 items divided in 3 sections. The first one includes 
personal information about company that could have time or economic nature (e.g. company name, 
activity, year of incorporation, number of founders, number of employees, financial information 
about sales and BEP). The second one comprises types of collaboration with outside actors (e.g. 
with universities, suppliers or other start-ups), adoption of innovative technologies (e.g. 4.0 
technologies) and sources of financing (e.g. personal funds or public funds). Finally, the third one 
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regards strategic directions (e.g. towards product development or increase of turnover) and 
operational (e.g. regarding BM), market (e.g. market entry decisions) or entrepreneurial (e.g. 
environmental sustainability strategies) decisions. The second questionnaire comprises 12 items, 
developed in 2 sections. The first section includes personal data about founders: e.g. past 
experiences of the founder, academic qualification or skills level. The second section regards the 
Network Ability (NA) (measured by the 4 components by Shu et al. (2017)), network frequency 
(of interaction), network strength and network governance mechanisms. Starting from a group of 
2914 companies, which represents Italian innovative start-ups included in Italian register and born 
between 2012 and 2017, 1397 have been contacted and, finally, 219 interviews have been 
conducted. A service provider company contacted these start-ups using a Computer-Assisted 
Telephone Interview (CATI) to collect the results, which later in the thesis will be analyzed through 
a statistical software called R (used through R Studio interface, an intuitive Integrated Development 
Environment (IDE) designed for R). As said before, the sample includes 219 start-ups, grouped 
according to ATECO (ISTAT, 2007) sector they belong (Table 2). Screening this sample, it is been 
recognized a new subsample of 179 companies; including those companies that perform 
“information service activities and other IT services” (30) and those that perform “software 
production, IT consulting and related activities” (149). Due to some missing values, regarding 
mainly networking, employees and turnover information; the sample is been further screened 
reducing the number of start-ups to 145. 
Table 2 – ATECO sectors classification of sample 
Source: ISTAT (2007) 
ATECO - Economic activity N. of start-ups
Advertising and market research 1
Architectural and engineering activities; testing and technical analysis 1
Creative, artistic, and entertainment activities 3
Film production, video and television programs, music and sound recordings 4
Information service activities and other IT services 30
Other manufacturing industries 1
Other professional, scientific, and technical activities 11
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 3
Publishing activities 16
Software production, IT consulting, and related activities 149
Total 219
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4.3 The sample 
 
The sample comprises 145 companies located all over the country. As confirmed in the paper about 
technological districts by Miceli (2010), northern side has a leading position in terms of firm 
concentration and technological specialization; in fact, the majority of innovative start-ups of the  
 
          Figure 12 – Regional distribution 
sample belong to the northern area, while only 
more than 20 belong to the southern area (Figure 
12). 
For what concerns the access to finance, as 
showed in Figure 13, start-ups, depending on 
their geographical locations, are compared 
considering the kind of source of financing 
adopted.  
                   
                     Source: own elaboration 
                                                              
 
Generally, all the start-ups prefer to 
get access to personal funds; this 
result is coherent with literature about 
access to finance in ICT start-ups 
(Corno et al., 2014). Observing 
Figure 13, all the values seem larger 
in the north: this confirms the classic 
north-south divide; on the other hand, 
the majority of the companies of the 
sample are located in northern area. 
Crowdfunding and incubator funding  
services are generally not adopted;  
8725
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Figure 13 – Overview of sources of financing 
Source: own elaboration 
73 
 
possible explanations could be obtained by analyzing literature. In the first case, crowdfunding 
campaigns conducted in Italy showed a lower performance than other countries like Germany 
(Rossi & Vismara, 2018); in the second case, incubators, science parks and crowdfunding represent 
a recent phenomenon in Italy (Corsi & Berardino, 2014), furthermore innovative start-ups tend to 
exploit more other incubator services like networking (Cooper et al., 2012). Finally, center and 
southern area do not show significant differences, except for public funding, which is slightly more 
common in the southern area, and for personal funding, which is stronger in the central area. 
 
In the next table (Table 3), start-ups are screened by type and, for each type, some personal and 
strategic information are reported; the majority of the companies are independent (127), while the 
remaining ones are spin-off companies (18). If number of BM changes is stable among groups 
(slightly higher for academic spin-offs), other variables show different results.  
Academic spin-offs show the lowest average turnover and the highest age; all these start-ups adopt 
a strategy aimed to increase turnover and only the 63% of this group is focused on product 
development; finally, they are more likely to innovate their BM to develop new collaborations than 
other kinds of start-ups. 
Corporate spin-offs show the greatest average turnover and the younger age; they show an opposite 
strategic orientation compared to the previous group and less than 50% of these start-ups changed 
their BM to pursue a collaborative approach. 
Independent companies have a higher turnover than the first group, but lower than corporate spin-
offs, the age is in the middle of the three groups; finally, strategic orientation is focused more on 
product development than turnover, while the BM is rarely changed to match collaborative 
strategies. 
 
Table 3 – A financial and strategic summary 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Finally, in Figure 14, it is considered networking and personal skills of the companies, divided in 
the 3 previous groups. In particular, “Network Ability” is equal to the mean of the four components 
(expressed on a Likert scale) introduced in the paper by Shu et al. (2017) (network orientation, 
all values are expressed in mean Turnover Age Stra_turn Stra_prod_dev N. BM change BM_change_coll
Academic spin-off (8) 87500 3.50 1.00 0.63 1.625 0.50
Corporate spin-off (10) 394100 2.90 0.70 1.00 1.400 0.40
Independent company (127) 185545 3.45 0.80 0.91 1.291 0.31
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network building, network maintenance and network coordination). “Skills” represents the mean 
among 5 indicators (expressed on a Likert scale) that represent the specific competencies of the 
founder in 5 fields: ICT, management, market, technology and relations. 
 
 
Figure 14 – Network Ability of start-ups 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Academic spin-offs have the highest degrees of competencies and the highest ability of set and 
nurture networking relationships; this confirms their importance in managing and generating 
knowledge, even though they have the lowest turnover (Table 3). Nevertheless, they experience 
some troubles in capturing the value generated from innovation process (Harrison & Leitch, 2010). 
Corporate spin-offs, even if they show a lower level of NA and Skills, they are able to reach a 
better financial performance (Table 3); the main reason under this lack is the nature of the 
knowledge that, in this case, is more commercial rather than theoretical (Wennberg et al., 2011). 
 
4.4 The regression analysis 
 
The hypotheses introduced before regard Business Model (BM), Network Ability (NA) and 
networking in general with many managerial and economic implications. To test the validity of 
those assumptions, we estimated 10 regression models. 
Skills (mean)
Net Ability (mean)
5,45
5,34
5,36
5,00
5,16
4,89
Academic spin-off Corporate spin-off Independent company
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4.4.1 Dependent variable(s) 
 
Many articles regarding OI practices point out how these kinds of strategies affect positively 
financial performance (Chesbrough, 2003); these positive effects can be found applying 
collaborative strategies (Timmers, 1998; Eisingerich et al., 2010); setting networking relationship 
through exploitation of the NA (Sigmund et al., 2015); collaborating actively with incubators 
(Sedita & Apa, 2016). For all these reasons, the first dependent variable is turnover, in its 
logarithmic form due to scale issues, (Ln_turn); which is included in two regression tables.  
 
It is interesting to understand how the degrees of collaborations are affected by networking 
management and control mechanisms (Snehota & Håkansson, 1995; Teegen & Doh, 2002). This 
allows a closer look to those mechanisms, regarding degrees of openness or governance issues; 
which often have implications that do not necessarily have economic or financial implications 
(Dahlander & Gann, 2010). For all these motives, the second dependent variable is the likelihood 
of collaboration with universities for market reasons, expressed on a Likert scale, 
(Coll_uni_market); in particular, this kind of collaboration represents a good benchmark of 
collaborative strategies in general thanks to the implications on networking features, skills and 
incubation services (Table 4).  
 
4.4.2 Independent variables 
 
Within the thesis, after an overview of OI theory and practices, focus moved first on BM creation 
and innovation; later focus moved on networking relationships and mechanisms. For these reasons, 
the following independent variables, grouped in 5 categories for sake of clarity, are added in the 
framework. 
 
Business Model Innovation (BMI) and collaborations. To manage properly BM creation or change, 
company has to set the right relationships with other actors belonging to value chain; the entire 
production process and all the business activities rely on an active and complex network (Konsti-
Laakso et al., 2012). In the regression model, we will try to demonstrate if a company that is starting 
a BM change aimed to an internationalization strategy will have a positive effect on performance 
through a collaboration with other companies (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Kock et al., 2010). Start-
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ups are used to enter global markets and sometimes it is the only way they can survive; furthermore, 
it is demonstrated that network building and collaborations boost efficacy of this global strategy 
(Cannone & Ughetto, 2014). Hence, 3 variables are added in the framework. Bm_change_inter, a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the start-up undertook a BM change to enter a foreign market; 
Coll_same_market, the likelihood of collaborations with other start-ups for market knowledge 
exchange (variable expressed on a Likert scale); Coll_same_market*Bm_change_inter, an 
interaction variable among the 2 previous variables just introduced.   
 
The role of collaborations. Collaborative strategies play an important role within the thesis: they 
could affect the financial performance (Eisingerich et al., 2010) and enhance the likelihood to adopt 
an approach which embraces openness (Dahlander & Gann, 2010). The focus is on collaboration 
breadth, i.e. which are the partners of the collaboration; in fact, the reasons under which a company 
collaborated with partners are not taken in consideration (all collaborations are carried on for 
market reasons). 5 variables are introduced. Coll_same_market, already introduced; 
Coll_sup_market, likelihood of collaboration with suppliers for market reasons (variable 
expressed on a Likert scale); Coll_uni_market4, likelihood of collaboration with universities for 
market reasons (expressed on a Likert scale); Coll_cli_market, likelihood of collaboration with 
customers for market reasons (variable expressed on a Likert scale); Coll_consul_market, 
likelihood of collaboration with private consultants for market reasons (expressed on a Likert 
scale). 
 
Network Ability. To measure the NA, the 4 variables stemming from the paper by Shu et al. (2017) 
are included in the regression: network orientation (Net_orient), network building (Net_build), 
network maintenance (Net_maint), network coordination (Net_coord). Net_ability is a variable 
that is the mean of these 4 components. All these variables are expressed on a Likert scale. Finally, 
it will be analyzed the interaction between network building and collaboration with customers for 
market reasons (Coll_cli_market*Net_build). 
 
Impact of incubator on networking. To measure how incubation process affects the ability of the 
founder to set networking relationships (Lesáková, 2012) and impact of incubator on financial 
                                                 
4 This variable is set as independent when, in the regression, Ln_turn is the dependent variable; while it is the 
dependent variable in the last regression table.  
77 
 
performance (Sedita et al., 2019); 2 variables are introduced. Incubator, a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if start-ups set a relationship with private or public incubator or 0 if it is not; 
Incubator*Net_ability, interaction term between the former variable and Network Ability (NA). 
 
Autocratic vs trust-based relationships. Once companies established right partners and 
relationships, they should establish the right control mechanisms to manage network on a long-
term horizon; ultimately, if it is better to adopt an autocratic or collaborative control mechanism 
(Hamilton & Biggart, 1988; Teegen & Doh, 2002). For this purpose, 3 variables are added in the 
regression framework. Net_stren, average strength of relationships with other founders, employees 
and external partners (expressed on a Likert scale); Net_freq,  average frequency of interactions 
with other founders, employees and external partners (expressed on a Likert scale); Net_gov, a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 if founders exercise their power on subordinates and to 0 if it 
is not. 
In the Table 4, there is the correlation matrix, which includes all the 26 variables with means and 
standard deviations.  
 
4.4.3 Control variables 
 
Variables selection process provided as outcome 10 variables, included in all the regression tables 
that can be grouped, for a clearer understanding, in 3 categories. 
 
Time, size and location. For what concerns dimensional factors, it is widely recognized a liability 
of smallness that deeply affects start-ups (Sigmund et al., 2015); hence numbers of founders 
(N_found) and number of employees (Ln_empl), the latter in its logarithmic form due to scale 
issues, are included in the regressions. For what concerns time factors, it is recognized a liability 
of newness that causes an early failure of the majority of start-ups; this is likely to affect the 
performance of those companies (Abatecola et al., 2012). Hence, the age of the company at 2018 
(Age) and the stage of company in start-up life cycle (Stage) are included in the regressions. 
Finally, to measure the geographic impact, it is included a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
start-up is located in the north or 0 if it is not (North). 
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Personal skills and competencies. Personal skills or competencies that are owned by start-ups could 
be really relevant, due to their size and the importance of the founder in performance (Corno et al., 
2014). Hence, it is introduced a variable (Skills), expressed on a Likert scale, that measures the 
average skill level of the founder on 5 fields: ICT, management, market, technology and relations. 
Moreover, it is added a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the majority of the founders within the 
start-up are graduated, while to 0 if it is not (Graduate). 
 
Strategy and Funding. Strategic implications can affect the performance and collaborative 
relationships (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010); furthermore, the fact that start-ups use certain sources 
of financing instead of others has a different impact on dependent variables (Corno et al., 2014). 
For all these considerations, 3 variables are included. Stra_turn, a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 if start-ups adopt a strategy aimed to experience a fast growth in revenues. Stra_prodev, a 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if companies adopt a strategy aimed to product development. 
Fund_personal, a dummy variable that has a value equal to 1 if start-ups use personal funds to 
finance their business.  
 
4.4.4 Results and implications 
 
In Table 5, 6 and 7, it is possible to check results of regression models; beyond p-values for each 
coefficient, every regression model has some indexes to check the validity and accuracy of the 
model. In particular, Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) is a good predictor of accuracy of the 
model (Hyndman & Koehler, 2006); Variance Inflation Factor is a proper index to check if there 
is an excessive multi-collinearity among variables (O’Brien, 2007); R squared and Adjusted R 
squared are a good measure of the overall fit of the regression model (Cameron & Windmeijer, 
1997). 
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Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 Age 3.41 1.04 1.00
2 N_found 2.87 1.24 -0.13 1.00
3 Stage 2.88 0.57 0.22** 0.02 1.00
4 Ln_turn 11.51 1.17 0.12 -0.06 0.15† 1.00
5 Coll_sup_market 3.27 2.14 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 0.13 1.00
6 Coll_cli_market 4.86 1.96 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.24** 1.00
7 Coll_same_market 3.67 2.06 -0.06 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.22** 0.17* 1.00
8 Coll_consul_market 3.56 1.91 -0.11 0.07 -0.13 -0.04 0.06 0.17* 0.02 1.00
9 Coll_uni_market 3.17 2.20 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.17* 0.31*** 0.23** 0.24** 1.00
10 Incubator 0.37 0.49 0.02 0.12 0.01 -0.10 0.13 -0.07 0.06 0.09 0.24** 1.00
11 Fund_personal 0.94 0.23 0.16† -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.10 0.15† -0.12 -0.13 1.00
12 Stra_turn 0.80 0.40 0.05 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.04 0.19* -0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.08 0.11 1.00
13 Stra_prodev 0.90 0.31 0.03 0.07 -0.15† 0.15† 0.03 0.10 0.14† 0.16† -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.06 1.00
14 Bm_change_inter 0.19 0.40 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.17* 0.03 0.18† 0.11 0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.11 1.00
15 North 0.60 0.49 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.13 -0.10 -0.23** -0.08 -0.19* -0.08 -0.01 -0.14 0.05 -0.09 -0.06 1.00
16 Graduate 0.80 0.40 -0.08 0.11 -0.01 -0.15† 0.03 0.06 -0.11 0.01 0.16* 0.14 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.16† 1.00
17 Skills 5.19 0.88 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.24** 0.17* -0.05 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.14† 0.04 -0.17* 1.00
18 Net_orient 4.54 0.90 -0.24** 0.16† -0.27** -0.05 0.19* 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.11 -0.08 0.03 -0.14† -0.05 0.02 0.17* 1.00
19 Net_build 4.36 1.05 -0.22** 0.09 0.02 -0.19* 0.04 0.18* 0.14† 0.10 0.14† 0.09 0.14† 0.12 0.05 -0.07 -0.12 0.12 0.27** 0.31*** 1.00
20 Net_maint 5.30 1.01 -0.21** 0.06 0.23** 0.01 0.18* 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.01 -0.08 0.12 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.21* 0.22** 0.40*** 1.00
21 Net_coord 5.48 0.91 -0.10 0.19* 0.15† -0.07 0.06* 0.13 0.10 0.23** 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.15† -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.23** 0.09 0.43***0.55*** 1.00
22 Net_ability 4.92 0.69 -0.27*** 0.17* 0.06 -0.11 0.16 0.16† 0.13 0.18* 0.14† 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 0.31***0.56***0.77***0.77***0.72*** 1.00
23 Net_freq 5.30 1.31 -0.07 0.10 -0.04 0.13 0.12 0.14† 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.03 -0.11 0.01 0.11 0.07 -0.07 -0.08 0.17* -0.04 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.09 1.00
24 Net_stren 4.65 1.24 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.16† 0.18* 0.00 -0.02 -0.13 0.10 0.14† -0.08 0.01 0.25** -0.04 0.22** 0.11 0.20* 0.18* 0.60*** 1.00
25 Net_gov 0.64 0.48 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 -0.13 -0.12 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.11 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.15† -0.10 -0.12 -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 1.00
26 Ln_empl 1.47 0.61 0.06 0.32*** 0.14† 0.50*** -0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.08 0.04 0.12 -0.14 -0.09 0.03 0.04 0.12 -0.06 -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.26** 0.13 -0.03 1.00
Table 4 – Correlation matrix 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
Analyzing the Table 5, the Model 1 includes only the control variables: N_found has a negative 
impact on turnover, probably because of conflicts that can arise among founders, while conducting 
business; as predictable, an additional employee can increase turnover, because of the additional 
output unit produced. It is interesting to notice that, if Stra_prodev has a significant positive effect 
on financial performance, Stra_turn does not have any significant effect; this suggests that company 
should interpret turnover as a consequence of the strategy, instead of an aim.  
The Model 2 tests Hypotheses 3a and 3b, in particular, if collaboration shows a positive impact on 
financial performance; this impact should be stronger in case of collaboration with customers and 
suppliers. Surprisingly, collaborations do not affect financial performance by themselves; hence, 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b are both rejected. Probably, these variables should interact with other 
components to show a financial impact (Sedita et al., 2019). 
The Model 3 tests Hypothesis 1: start-ups that change their BM, to start an internationalization 
strategy, experience a positive effect on financial performance if they set collaborations with other 
start-ups. If BM change by itself shows a significant negative effect on turnover, the interaction 
between the latter variable and collaboration with other start-ups have a significant positive impact; 
hence, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
  
Figure 15 – Interaction plot of Coll_same_market*Bm_change_inter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
81 
 
Observing Figure 15, it is clear that a start-up which is changing its BM to enter a global market 
should take in consideration a collaboration with other start-ups. 
The Model 4, following the directions of the paper by Sedita et al. (2019), tests an alternative 
solution to Hypotheses 3a and 3b. In particular, collaboration with customers is fruitful and affects 
performance of the company if it is matched by a nurture of network building; that is a sort of 
propeller of collaborative strategies (Lesáková, 2012). 
 
Figure 16 – Interaction plot of Coll_cli_market*Net_build 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Low levels of network building can hinder exploitation of advantages stemming from collaborative 
strategies with customers; on the contrary, higher levels of network building can affect positively 
turnover, when collaboration with customer is deepened over time (Figure 16). 
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Table 5 – Results from the first regression on turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Constant 8.725*** 8.575*** 8.760*** 11.204***
(0.894) (0.974) (1.032) (1.393)
Control variables
Age 0.031 0.037 0.056 -0.018
(0.091) (0.100) (0.096) (0.098)
Stage 0.186 0.180 0.162 0.184
(0.192) (0.198) (0.201) (0.193)
N_found -0.213** -0.205** -0.206** -0.206**
(0.074) (0.076) (0.076) (0.069)
Ln_empl 1.043*** 1.034*** 1.034*** 1.006***
(0.160) (0.168) (0.167) (0.167)
Graduate -0.173 -0.170 -0.210 -0.157
(0.208) (0.224) (0.232) (0.215)
North 0.129 0.168 0.158 0.125
(0.176) (0.185) (0.187) (0.190)
Skills 0.115 0.099 0.095 0.176
(0.108) (0.120) (0.120) (0.119)
Fund_personal 0.175 0.163 0.110 0.399
(0.472) (0.497) (0.495) (0.421)
Stra_prodev 0.624* 0.598* 0.579* 0.657*
(0.256) (0.271) (0.264) (0.270)
Stra_turn -0.056 -0.085 -0.096 -0.003
(0.196) (0.205) (0.203) (0.202)
Independent variables
Coll_same_market 0.012 -0.026 0.015
(0.051) (0.063) (0.048)
Coll_sup_market 0.060 0.074 0.056
(0.049) (0.051) (0.047)
Coll_uni_market -0.013 -0.022 -0.003
(0.041) (0.040) (0.039)
Coll_cli_market 0.014 0.021 -0.424*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.202)
Coll_consul_market -0.004 0.011 -0.033
(0.050) (0.047) (0.046)
Interaction variables
Bm_change_inter -0.737†
(0.410)
Coll_same_market*Bm_change_inter 0.173†
(0.090)
Net_build -0.721**
(0.255)
Net_build*Coll_cli_market 0.103*
(0.048)
RMSE 0.940 0.930 0.919 0.887
Average VIF 1.106 1.198 1.659 4.678°
R² 0.352 0.366 0.381 0.423
Adjusted R² 0.304 0.292 0.298 0.346
Robust standard errors in parentheses
°VIF tends to increase when an interaction term is included in the model
Significant codes:    0 ' *** '   0.001 ' ** '   0.01 ' * '   0.05 ' †'   0.1 ' '   1  
Ln_turn
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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The table 6 represents results stemming from the second regression conducted on Ln_turn. The 
model 1 is the same model of the previous regression table, including only control variables; hence, 
results are identical. 
Model 2 tests Hypothesis 5: if network orientation, building, maintenance and coordination have a 
positive financial impact within the company. If network orientation, network maintenance and 
network coordination do not have a significant impact on turnover level; network building is the 
only variable that affects financial performance, even though, this effect seems to be negative. 
Hence, Hypothesis 5 is rejected. These results rebut what is been demonstrated in the paper by 
Sigmund et al. (2015); nevertheless, Shu et al. (2017) demonstrated a positive impact of the 4 
network components on “opportunity discovery” and not on financial performance. Probably, the 
benefits of the NA translate in financial benefits only in the long-term; in the short-term, efforts 
and costs employed to build networks prevail on the benefits stemming from them. 
Model 3 tests Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b: if relationship with an incubator affects positively 
financial performance by itself and if this interaction has an effect mediated by entrepreneurial 
ability (Network Ability) of start-ups. Incubator variable has a strong and significant positive effect 
on turnover, thus confirming all the benefits expressed in academic literature (Masutha & 
Rogerson, 2015; Sedita et al., 2019). Thus, Hypothesis 4a is supported. Interaction between 
incubation process and entrepreneurial capability (Network Ability) has a significant impact on 
financial performance; hence, Hypothesis 4b is supported as well. Nevertheless, if NA is confirmed 
as a propeller of financial performance (Lesáková, 2012), the effect appears to be negative. 
Probably, in Italy, incubation services are not developed and well added in a proper policy 
framework (Corsi & Berardino, 2014); it is also true that start-ups are not completely ready to 
exploit completely offerings provided by incubators (Cooper et al., 2012). A possible conclusion 
can be deducted from Figure 17: start-ups with a low level of Network Ability (NA) (e.g. 3), when 
they enter an Incubator, reach a higher financial performance (Ln_turn is between 12 and 13) than 
start-ups with similar level of Network Ability (NA) that do not enter an Incubator (Ln_turn is 
between 11 and 12). Nevertheless, at higher levels of Network Ability (NA) (e.g. 6) trend reverses; 
hence, start-ups within an incubator experience a worse performance (Ln_turn is between 10 and 
11) than those which do not enter an incubator (Ln_turn is between 11 and 12). Incubator can be 
considered as an important partner when start-ups are building their NA; nevertheless, these 
advantages are not exploited by start-ups with higher levels of this capability. In fact, Incubator are 
useful to those companies at their earliest stages of life (Bergek & Norrman, 2008). 
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Table 6 – Results from the second regression on turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Constant 8.725*** 8.534*** 7.850***
(0.894) (1.081) (1.139)
Control variables
Age 0.031 0.004 0.011
(0.091) (0.094) (0.094)
Stage 0.186 0.257 0.187
(0.192) (0.210) (0.183)
N_found -0.213** -0.209** -0.176*
(0.074) (0.076) (0.074)
Ln_empl 1.043*** 1.062*** 1.048***
(0.160) (0.161) (0.154)
Graduate -0.173 -0.075 -0.112
(0.208) (0.214) (0.212)
North 0.129 0.083 0.181
(0.176) (0.182) (0.175)
Skills 0.115 0.178 0.190†
(0.108) (0.112) (0.098)
Fund_personal 0.175 0.262 0.202
(0.472) (0.456) (0.446)
Stra_prodev 0.624* 0.631** 0.589*
(0.256) (0.232) (0.022)
Stra_turn -0.056 0.056 -0.051
(0.196) (0.196) (0.194)
Independent variables
Net_orient 0.141
(0.098)
Net_build -0.232*
(0.095)
Net_maint 0.064
(0.101)
Net_coord -0.088
(0.133)
Interaction variables
Net_ability 0.098
(0.162)
Incubator 3.033*
(1.220)
Net_ability*Incubator -0.677**
(0.246)
RMSE 0.940 0.908 0.896
Average VIF 1.106 1.309 9.521°
R² 0.352 0.395 0.411
Adjusted R² 0.304 0.329 0.353
Robust standard errors in parentheses
°VIF tends to increase when an interaction term is included in the model
Significant codes:    0 ' *** '   0.001 ' ** '   0.01 ' * '   0.05 ' †'   0.1 ' '   1  
Ln_turn
Model 3Model 1 Model 2
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Figure 17 – Interaction plot of Net_ability*Incubator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
For what concerns Table 7, Model 1 includes only control variables which are the same used in the 
previous regression tables; even though, in this case results are different. In fact, founders that are 
graduated are more likely to collaborate with universities (Graduate); these founders were student 
in the past, hence they know which are the main services offered by university to support start-ups. 
Furthermore, skilled founders are more likely to collaborate with universities (Skills); they see this 
institution as a knowledge generator that can increase skills and competencies (Wennberg et al., 
2011). 
Model 2 tests Hypothesis 2, under which a company will adopt an open approach in managing its 
collaborations. Collaboration with clients, start-ups and private consultants show a positive effect 
on likelihood of collaboration with universities; start-ups will collaborate with different actors to 
offset limits and exploit complementarities among actors. For instance, collaboration with start-
ups or customers could offset limits, in terms of commercialization and market skills, showed by 
universities (Wilson, 2012). Hence, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
Model 3 tests Hypothesis 6: start-ups that adopt trust-based and, at the same time, autocratic 
approach are able to enhance degrees of collaboration with their partners. Network frequency and 
network governance (autocratic governance system) do not affect dependent variable by 
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themselves; while network strength and interaction variable between the latter variable and network 
governance show a significant impact on dependent variable. In particular, network strength by 
itself has a significant positive effect on collaboration with universities; companies that deepen 
their relationships will likely build a strong relationship and share the risk with their partners, 
improving efficacy of collaboration itself (Barnir & Smith, 2002). The interaction variable has a 
negative impact on the dependent variable: start-ups that adopt an autocratic approach, while 
deepening their networking relationship, they will not improve degrees of collaboration with 
universities; on the contrary, start-ups that do not adopt an autocratic approach are able to increase 
degrees of collaboration, while relationships becomes stronger over time (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18 – Interaction plot of Net_stren*Net_gov 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
It is demonstrated in many papers that, under an OI perspective, informal ties, often, work better 
than formal ones (Brunswicker & Ehrenmann, 2013; Liew et al., 2013; Rampersad et al., 2010); 
finally, trust-based relationships guarantee more free knowledge flows, less costs and transmission 
of tacit knowledge than more formalized relationships. 
 
 
87 
 
Table 7 – Results from regression on collaboration with universities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Constant 2.134 0.292 -0.038
(1.853) (1.830) (2.562)
Control variables
Age -0.001 0.118 0.089
(0.184) (0.183) (0.181)
Stage -0.242 -0.256 -0.274
(0.321) (0.321) (0.326)
N_found -0.159 -0.203 -0.189
(0.173) (0.169) (0.181)
Ln_empl 0.308 0.271 0.226
(0.323) (0.310) (0.345)
Graduate 1.113* 1.171** 1.177**
(0.483) (0.422) (0.436)
North -0.419 0.117 0.069
(0.386) (0.361) (0.373)
Skills 0.564** 0.329† 0.290
(0.209) (0.182) (0.187)
Fund_personal -1.498 -1.411 -1.366
(1.030) (0.973) (0.982)
Stra_prodev -0.415 -0.890 -1.048
(0.750) (0.616) (0.672)
Stra_turn -0.057 -0.398 -0.257
(0.506) (0.475) (0.458)
Independent variables
Coll_cli_market 0.257** 0.246**
(0.091) (0.092)
Coll_same_market 0.225* 0.250**
(0.089) (0.095)
Coll_sup_market 0.044 0.034
(0.086) (0.089)
Coll_consul_market 0.255* 0.238†
(0.118) (0.129)
Interaction variables
Net_freq -0.260
(0.369)
Net_stren 0.529†
(0.270)
Net_gov 0.340
(2.334)
Net_freq*Net_gov 0.371
(0.434)
Net_stren*Net_gov -0.591†
(0.356)
RMSE 2.063 1.870 1.833
Average VIF 1.106 1.158 5.880°
R² 0.111 0.270 0.298
Adjusted R² 0.044 0.191 0.191
Robust standard errors in parentheses
°VIF tends to increase when an interaction term is included in the model
Significant codes:    0 ' *** '   0.001 ' ** '   0.01 ' * '   0.05 ' †'   0.1 ' '   1  
Coll_uni_market
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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4.5 Cluster analysis: identifying three types of innovative start-ups 
 
The last step of the overall statistical analysis, introduced in the thesis, involves a hierarchical 
clustering analysis. The dendrogram stemming from this cluster analysis suggested 3 as optimal 
number to cut the cluster tree; cluster analysis is been performed considering 5 variables: Ln_turn, 
Incubator, Stra_turn, Stra_prodev and Net_ability. 
The clustering algorithm that is been chosen is an alternative version of the classic Ward method: 
this method is aimed to minimizing the overall within-cluster variance; as the classic method, this 
variant shares the same aim but there is a difference. After that distances are computed, these are 
squared before being included as input of the clustering analysis (Murtagh & Legendre, 2014). 
 
Figure 19 – Identification of clusters 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 19 depicts all three clusters identified after the analysis; it can be noticed that Cluster 1 has 
the lowest level, Cluster 2 is in the middle, while Cluster 3 has the highest turnover level. 
Considering all the average values of the variables used in clustering approach, it is possible to 
depict a profile of three start-up archetypes: the Friendly Newcomers, the Potential Winners and 
the Far-sighted Star (Table 8). 
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Table 8 – The three start-up archetypes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The Friendly Newcomer. 49 start-ups belong to this archetype, the key features of these start-ups 
are the lowest average turnover level and a consistently high level of average NA; they are defined 
by this name because they will likely exploit and set collaborative relationships with other partners 
(Friendly) and, at the same time, they did not experience a turnover growth (Newcomers). 
 
The Potential Winner. 68 start-ups belong to this group, if these companies show all the 
prerequisites needed to be a top-performer (e.g. highest level of average NA and almost 90% of 
start-ups with a strategic orientation towards product development); they are overtaken by the third 
cluster, in terms of average turnover. They represent a sort of question mark: they own a potential 
that is not “unlocked” to reach a better financial performance. 
 
The Far-sighted Star. Only 28 start-ups belong to this cluster, these start-ups show the best level of 
average turnover and the lowest level of average NA; 100% of the start-ups belonging to this group 
adopts a strategy aimed to product development and only 68% of these start-ups is focused on 
turnover increase. They are far-sighted because of their prevailing strategic orientation that 
Friendly Newcomer Potential Winner Far-sighted Star
N. of start-ups 49 68 28
Ln_turn (mean) 10.220 11.958 12.688
Incubator (%) 38.78% 35.29% 39.29%
Stra_turn (%) 87.76% 79.41% 67.86%
Stra_prodev (%) 83.67% 89.71% 100.00%
Net_ability (mean) 5.015 5.191 4.098
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considers turnover as a consequence and not a direct strategic purpose; furthermore, they are star 
because of their astonishing financial performance. 
 
It is clear that a strategic orientation towards product development is a winning and wise strategy 
(highest percent level in Far-sighted Stars, while lowest percent level in Friendly Newcomers); 
while strategy aimed to an increase in turnover is a weak and incomplete strategy (lowest percent 
level in Far-sighted Stars, while highest percent level in Friendly Newcomers). Finally, the overall 
low percentage of start-ups that entered an incubator could be a signal of the weak development of 
these kinds of services within Italian context (Corsi & Berardino, 2014). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The entire work gave important contributions to the OI literature and the business literature in 
general; these contributions can be found throughout all the chapters. 
 
First, if the OI topic is been stressed and explained in a detailed way throughout all the chapters, 
many examples of open innovators (like BlaBlaCar or P&G) contributed to assess the operational 
feasibility and the empirical validity of the OI. The differences among these companies show how 
OI paradigm it is applied in many different firms, unless the diverse size or business strategy. Many 
authors recognized the importance of the OI; the point is that only some of them provided examples 
of a concrete application of the concept. 
 
Secondly, the redesigned BM represents an innovative tool: even though this tool is anchored to 
the existing literature, it is able to introduce a brand new perspective with new theoretical 
implications. The contributions regard the way well-known theories are put together within this 
framework. Resource-Based View (RBV) and activity system perspective make us understand how 
companies have to understand which are the core resources that justify their competitive 
advantages and, in addition, which are their main activities and how they should linked among each 
other to generate synergies. Customerization perspective gives to the customer a leading role in 
deciding the success of certain start-ups: the empowerment of them represents an interesting 
opportunity for innovative start-ups, only if this process is managed through setting the right value 
proposition delivered through the right channels to stimulate a long-term brand advocacy. The latter 
is very important in ICT industry: social media are deeply affected by the advocates, people that 
talk positively about a brand in a spontaneous way.  
All these mechanisms have to be translated into revenues: to choose certain revenue models, 
instead of others, can leverage or “destroy” the potential profitability stemming from the tools 
previously introduced. For instance, start-ups that develop and sell apps should seriously consider 
the freemium revenue model: in this way, they are able to meet two different segments of 
customers; the ones that want to exploit the app for free and the ones that want to exploit more 
advanced functions in exchange of a certain fee.  
Cost management is not only a matter of operational efficiency, but also a matter of innovation: 
the question is how to provide more utility with a lower cost. Chinese companies that exploited 
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cost innovation taught a valuable lesson to western companies; this strategy does not depend only 
on geographical advantages, companies located outside Asian countries can apply this strategy.  
Finally, all those building blocks are embedded in a networking perspective in which all the 
partners embody an important role in the overall value creation process. 
  
Finally, the Network Ability (NA) is a new concept that does not have a consolidated literature; 
this thesis gave more theoretical and empirical recognition to this innovative concept, showing all 
the potential benefits stemming from it and the financial implications, the latter often neglected in 
business papers. For instance, in the paper by Shu et al. (2017), it is demonstrated how NA has an 
important role in discovering hidden opportunities in the market; nevertheless, nothing is affirmed 
about the financial performance. Moreover, the addition of the personal skills of the founder in the 
regression framework ensures a consideration of the individual attitude in entrepreneurship. 
 
Furthermore, there are contributions that regard managerial implications and suggestions addressed 
to start-ups and their founders. 
 
First, a good explanation of the BM guarantees that founders, in designing business strategy, take 
in consideration the importance of this tool and the consequences that it has in shaping the firm 
performance. In addition, the thesis deals with Business Model Innovation (BMI): companies have 
to change their BM over time to cope with the external environment; this can work only if it is 
adopted a flexible approach and it is nurtured the relationships with the other partners belonging to 
the company network. In fact, BMI allows to overcome all those internal challenges, like 
organizational inertia and internal employee resistance, and external challenges belonging to the 
external environment. 
 
Secondly, we stress the importance of governance mechanisms in co-creation process; many 
authors stressed the concept itself and provided some examples, but few of them dealt with 
governance systems. In the thesis, it is introduced the concept of free leakage of information that 
should be switched with the selective reveal: an excessive free leakage of information can harm a 
full exploitation of the benefits stemming from the leakage itself; provision of tool kits and the 
presence of internal employees can ensure a proper management and control of the entire co-
creation process. 
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Thirdly, after an analysis of the effects of networking on financial performance and a description 
of the role of incubators in this context, we dealt with the governance systems that should be 
adopted to manage relationships in the long-term. In particular, the classic difference between an 
autocratic approach and a trust-based approach is discussed and overcome: both approaches can 
co-exist and offset their respective limits. Informal relationships can encourage more trust between 
parties and hopefully drive to more stable and strong ties; autocratic relationship can encourage a 
diverse distribution of power among parties and a more stable governance system with formalized 
rules. 
 
Fourthly, all the statistical analyses conducted in this work encouraged a clear vision of the NA: 
through results stemming from regression framework and cluster analysis, start-ups are able to 
understand how NA works and which are the main drivers of profitability and success in matter of 
innovation. Ultimately, choosing the proper mix between NA and these drivers represents the key 
to build a winning business strategy. In fact, NA is conceived as a propeller that, even though by 
itself does not show positive effects on financial performance, can provide several advantages when 
combined with other factors. For instance, in our regression framework, an interaction of NA with 
incubation process showed a significant effect on financial performance; the same effect cannot be 
found in NA by itself. 
 
If this thesis gave some contributions on several levels to recent literature about OI and NA, there 
some limitations and aspects that are not been stressed here; these latter features can represent the 
starting point of further research by other authors.  
 
First, the importance of knowledge was stressed within all the chapters; nevertheless, in regression 
models and in clustering analysis it has been treated only marginally. Future research could focus 
on knowledge flows to consider other mechanisms that affect business relationships and innovative 
performance, e.g. absorptive capacity. For instance, other authors can check if absorptive capacity 
has an impact on NA and on financial performance; a statistical regression, including these factors, 
can be conducted to test empirically these phenomena. To measure this capacity authors could use 
R&D investment ratio and indicators about knowledge flows. 
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Secondly, the research conducted in this thesis maintained a strict focus on Italy, affected by 
cultural phenomena and demographic features; future research agenda could include the analysis 
of other national contexts to check if all the variables behave in a different way. In fact, many 
countries are deeply affected by cultural factors: this justifies why two countries could experience 
opposite outcomes when certain policies are decided, even though these policies are almost 
identical. It is also true that within the paper we considered cultural factors only marginally: 
institutional features and policies depend on several aspects that go beyond the topic of the thesis 
and the nature of our collected and sampled data. 
 
Thirdly, only Business Model Innovation (BMI) has been analyzed in regression models; other 
authors could focus on how BM per se affects financial performance and the effectiveness of 
collaborations. In addition, the contribution of the redesigned BM in existing literature is only 
theoretical and its empirical validity is not been demonstrated; future research agenda can involve 
a statistical analysis to test the concrete efficacy of the framework.  
Moreover, the focus was on start-ups that changed their BM to enter international markets; 
additional studies should be conducted on other reasons that can drive BMI, like for instance 
collaborative relationships or financial growth. 
 
Fourthly, it has been investigated the role of start-ups in ICT industries, it should be interesting to 
check if these principles work also in low-tech industries and within large companies. In fact, 
Network Ability is crucial for start-ups, especially at their earliest stages, but this does not mean 
that this ability can be easily replicated in a larger context and in industries in which innovation 
has not a leading role to generate competitive advantage. In low-tech industry, OI could have only 
a marginal effect and the disadvantages stemming from the introduction of these practices can 
prevail on the advantages. Furthermore, we expect that the importance of the personal skills owned 
by the founder decreases in larger companies: in this case, managers are accountable for conducting 
the business, while entrepreneurs are more focused on financial care. In addition, the type of 
company could represent an interesting discriminating factor: for instance, in our sample there are 
some spin-offs, even though they represent a low portion of the entire group of start-ups; this is 
also the reason why this little subgroup is not considered separately in the regression framework.  
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Furthermore, in performing clustering analysis, only few variables were used to apply grouping 
methods; it could be interesting to take in consideration other variables that, in turn, can provide 
new clusters and new implications. 
 
Finally, it is useful to express some considerations about our main character of this thesis, the start-
ups. Characterized by liability of smallness and liability of newness, they cope with many 
challenges that show up at their earliest stages already; here, the founder has a crucial role as 
catalyst of knowledge and in business decision process. For these reasons, recognizing their 
importance in the new paradigm of OI and in ICT industry, it is important to point out how to 
choose other types of company can substantially change the final results stemming from the thesis. 
For instance, as said before, larger companies show a different impact for certain choices and have 
to face some constraints and problems that are not necessarily faced by start-ups. It is not only a 
matter of size, in fact also the age and the type of company has a significant weight on the final 
results we reached in this work. Ultimately, we have to remember that we deal with innovative 
start-ups that serve the ICT market; other industries will likely imply another outcome. 
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